

PAKISTAN AND THE REGIONAL PACTS

Pakistan and the Regional Pacts

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To
ROSEMARY JOHNSTON

P R E F A C E

In writing this book, I have tried to avoid any comments which might exacerbate Pakistan's relations with any foreign country. I have confined myself to stating facts and interpreting them. Most of the statements in the book are supported by references, but no bibliography is included. I hope the scholars who are interested in research, will find the foot-notes useful. Lack of opportunity to visit the South-East Asian and the Middle Eastern countries has forced me to depend entirely on the material and sources available in Pakistan.

The book has profited particularly from the comments and suggestions as well as editorial guidance of my friend Mr. A. T. Chaudhri, Assistant Editor, *Morning News*, Karachi. I do wish to express my gratitude for his valuable assistance. I also wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Muftaba Ahmed, Deputy Director, U.S.I.S., who throughout the writing of this book gave me great encouragement.

I personally am solely responsible for all statements of fact or opinion appearing in the book.

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INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this book is to interpret and discuss, with particular reference to regional pacts, the foreign policy of Pakistan both in the course of its development over the years and in its present-day manifestations. Pakistan, not the regional pact, is the focus of this book. But before beginning discussion on it, it is essential to know what regional pacts are, why they come into being and what contribution they make to the preservation of international peace and security. A concise survey of this at the beginning should help the reader to appreciate Pakistan's role in the various important regional pacts, among which the Baghdad Pact

Regional pacts, generally speaking, are the urge among nations to form a common objective, to protect themselves against internal threats to their security. In the face of danger, it seeks to create a common cause among several states for a common defence. The desire of regional states to form a common front into a regional pact is a natural result of the

in the same region, since the modern concept of a region transcends the narrow confines of a geographical area.

Furthermore, a state may adhere to several different regional arrangements. The United States, for instance, is a member of the NATO and the Rio Treaty, each with a different membership. And the membership of the NATO itself extends from Canada and the United States to Greece and Turkey.

The term 'region' is being used with a variety of meaning. To a geographer, the region may mean an area with its natural formation and resources, communication and population etc. But what a regional arrangement connotes in foreign policy has only a remote connection with the geographer's definition of a region, since modern communications have obliterated physical barriers and linked together the farthest ends of the globe. It is the definition given by the German school of geopolitics that applies today—that is, an area which can play a cumulative role in a common defensive arrangement is a region.

Speaking of regions, the Chilean judge of the International Court of Justice, Alejandro Alvarez, observed: "There is no rule to determine regions. Their existence must be shown by circumstances and in particular by the agreements made by the states who constitute them." To this he added: "Regions are constituted by certain countries having affinities of race, institutions above all political interest."¹

Moreover, relative geographic proximity alone cannot contribute anything to unity when states have

1. E. Van Kleffens, "Regionalism and Political Pacts, *American Journal of International Law*, October 1949, p. 667.

nothing in common or are divided by cultural and religious differences

When in 1934, the Eastern Pact was signed, the difficulties of defining a regional arrangement were encountered. The question was whether the Eastern Pact should include Germany, Poland or Russia, or should the states of the Baltic Entente be included. Germany argued that she would ask Japan to participate in the Eastern Pact, if Soviet Russia insisted on the inclusion of France.¹

Indeed, there is no fixed or rigid rule to define a regional arrangement. However, at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Egyptian delegate had introduced a definition of regional arrangements which read as follows: "There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations."² This definition was discussed by the Sub Committee but was rejected on the ground that it failed to cover all the situations which might be covered by regional arrangements. The term 'regional arrangement' as used in Article 24 of the Charter has a wider scope than this definition.

1 International Section Oxford Treaty Series 1934, I, 118, p 196

2 UNCIO Interim Report to Committee on the Organization of the Conference, 111/4/A on the Amalgamation of Economic and Social Systems, 111/4/A/9, p 3 (Document, I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 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The factors influencing states to enter into regional pacts are often complex. The common racial, cultural and economic backgrounds are helpful in inducing states to build up a regional arrangement, but they are not essentially needed. The Pan American Union, for instance, is not based exclusively upon the common ties of trade, culture and civilization. The United States is bound by the ties of economic and cultural interests to Western Europe rather than to Latin America. The common religious and cultural background of Arab States also could not facilitate the formation of the Arab League, had they not been faced with a common concern with respect to Palestine.

States having a common ideology are sometimes persuaded that their interests will be preserved if they enter into a regional pact. It is true that an ideological concurrence can provide a strong basis for regional arrangement in an area, but at the same time ideological conflict can destroy it too. European history reveals that until the peace of Westphalia in 1648, religion was a strong ideological element in international affairs. But in spite of this, there existed regional arrangements between states professing different religions. By the treaty of 1570, for instance, several Roman Catholic and Protestant States entered into some sort of regional arrangement. In our times, Portugal which is not a democratic country in the real sense of the word is a member of NATO. It proves that a regional arrangement among states professing different ideologies is not impossible provided those ideologies are not antagonistic to one another. Some political thinkers consider ideology to be the handmaiden of national interest. In their opinion, regional pacts are first signed by states because of some

partly to the growth of subversive movements aimed at overthrowing established Governments. But so far as mere tendency among states to make regional pacts is concerned, it is known to be as old as history itself. As late as half a century B C Egypt, under King Amenophis IV, along with other neighbouring countries constituted a union of defensive nature. The ancient Greeks also formed regional pacts from time to time. Some of these pacts, as Peloponnesian, Aetolian, Achaean and Lycian Leagues, endured for quite a long time.

This may be going too far back into history. Brief statements of regional arrangements in the era between Waterloo and World War II would provide a setting for discussion on regionalism under the United Nations Charter. An outstanding example of regional arrangement prior to World War I would be the Germanic Confederation. The limited regional arrangements of the inter American, the Balkan and the Baltic area could also be mentioned. But many regional arrangements during this period were of an economic nature. As a writer observes "Before 1914, world integration was proceeding steadily by means of regional policies expressed in customs unions, preferential relationships, 'open door' arrangements, long term commercial treaties, inter related through the most favoured nation clause, monetary unions and world-wide acceptance of the gold standard."¹

During the period between 1919 and 1939, a number of regional arrangements which were political in nature, came into being. The most outstanding

1 Adolf B. Drucker, "Regional Economic Principles and Problems: Regionalism and World Organization" Washington D C 1944 p 104

Nevertheless, under the Covenant, though the States were free for the operation of almost any type of regional pact, the responsibility of seeking ways and means to repel aggression was vested in the Council of the League. A State, in case of attack, could take action in self defence. But there was no international police force, organised under the Covenant to back up that action. There was the Briand Kellog Pact which renounced aggressive wars. But it was merely a moral denunciation providing no hint to action that would be taken against the aggressor. The Briand Kellog Pact was not an isolated instance. The League too had condemned aggression a number of times, but when the occasion arose it failed to punish the aggressor. In this respect the League was an incompetent body, it could not do anything against aggression. Whatever pressure it could exercise was lifted by the common belief that aggression could be prevented by the force of world opinion, accompanied by economic sanctions. It was proved when economic sanctions were imposed on Italy, who had committed aggression against Abyssinia, that sanctions which hurt lead to war.

The failure of the global collective security of the League to combat the onslaught of Rome Berlin Tokyo Axis in Africa, Europe and Asia gave new impetus to regional pacts. At the end of the Second World War, the nations were convinced that regional arrangements can provide the best guarantee against a failure of the world organization to take action against aggression.

In 1943, Winston Churchill was strongly in favour of regional alliances. In a note to President Roosevelt, he had suggested three regional councils, one for Europe, another for the Western Hemisphere and a third for Asia. He had further suggested that the

top of these regional councils, there should be a world council composed of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. These states would also be members of the regional councils in which they were directly interested. Roosevelt and Sumner Welles agreed with Churchill's point of view. But Secretary of State Cordell Hull was opposed to it because he felt that regional arrangements should be kept subordinate to the world organization. However, he, along with other members of the State Department succeeded in changing the mind of the President in favour of an international organization.¹

The United States, nevertheless, did not abandon the system of regional arrangements as a pre-requisite to participation in the world organization. At Mexico city, a few weeks before the San Francisco Conference, the inter-American system was immeasurably strengthened through the recognition of the Pan-American Union and through the provision of the Act of Chapultepec. Under the provision of the Act of Chapultepec, the American Republics agreed that every attack by a state, whether a state of the Western Hemisphere or not, against the integrity of the territory or against the political independence of an American state should be considered an act of aggression against all. This reflected a new orientation towards regionalism.

When the United Nations Conference on international organization was opened on April 25, 1945 at San Francisco, the problem of regionalism was debated at great length. During the deliberations, the Latin American countries, while guaranteeing full cooperation

1. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, pp. 1643-46.

in setting up a world organization, insisted on retaining their regional arrangement. As they had already announced at Mexico city in 1944, that they would not like to see the inter American system coordinated and harmonized with the "general International organization for the realization of the latter's objective" ¹ The states of newly established Arab League, for whom Egypt acted as a spokesman, took a similar stand. The approach of France and the Soviet Union was also the same. France was concerned over possible renewal of German aggression, she, therefore, wanted to have freedom of action against ex enemy states without waiting for the approval of the Security Council. The Soviet Union wanted to have enough freedom under the Charter so that she could freely enter into bilateral mutual assistance pacts. The small nations at San Francisco were not happy with the powers that were granted to the Security Council in the light of the Yalta voting formula, which seemed to imply that a single permanent member of the Security Council could block action under any regional arrangement.

Finally, it was agreed that the Charter should approve the possibility that special arrangements and agencies, for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, might be set up on regional basis. Thus the importance of regional cooperation in maintaining world peace was internationally recognised.

But the Charter, however, provides no definition of regional arrangement or agency. Nor does it mention anything about the purpose of regional arrangements and their relations with the United Nations.

¹ Dr Helm Reid Regionalism under the United Nations ,
International Conciliation March 1946 p 124.

The term 'regional arrangement' as used in Article 51 seems to mean an arrangement by several states, through bilateral or multi-lateral agreements, to maintain international peace and security in an area. Further, a regional organization to be valid must, according to Article 103, conform to the Charter. Besides, the Charter prevents a regional organization from taking enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council. The regional arrangement is thus doomed, if the Security Council fails to act because of the veto. Under the voting provision of Article 27, any permanent member by its veto can prevent the regional type of enforcement action.

Taking note of this, John Foster Dulles said in an article in the *Foreign Affairs* (April 1954): "The Soviet Union, by its veto power has made it impractical, as yet, to make available to the Security Council the armed forces' assistance and 'facilities' contemplated by Article 43 of the Charter."

When the Charter was framed the inclusion of veto was considered necessary so that the Soviet Union could get into the organization and the Charter be ratified by the United States' Senate. But the result was obvious; the Security Council could be prevented, by the use of veto, from taking any concrete action in case of a crisis.

Besides, the United Nations, like the League of Nations, does not have an international police force to repel aggression. A Military Staff Committee was set up, under Article 47 of the Charter, as an organ of the United Nations. The body consisting of the Chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council was to organize an armed force. Because of friction between the Soviet Union and other permanent

members of the Security Council the importance of the Military Staff Committee was steadily reduced, as years passed by

The veto and the lack of an international police force might have made the structure of the United Nations ineffective if there had not been Article 51, which states that the Charter does not impair the "inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations". Although article 51 does not mention the name of regional arrangement it is self evident that members of a regional security pact are as much entitled to act in self defence individually or collectively, as any other state. Thus this Article provides the clue to unlock the enforcement power of the Charter. Most post war regional alliances have been justified for member states to come together in self defence if an attack occurs and if the Security Council fails to take the necessary effective measures. Such a failure may result when the permanent members of the Security Council cannot agree.

Article 51, it is believed, was an expression of want of confidence in the United Nations because the Security Council procedure for deciding that an armed attack had occurred was subject to veto by any one of the five permanent members. But the obligation to repel aggression was clearly set forth in the Charter and was more morally binding. Therefore, any tendency to replace the general UN commitment to oppose aggression by a series of regional pacts for defensive purpose which are outside the purview of UN, will be an anachronism and probably dangerous. Regional arrangements, if they are to be adequate and effective must be part of the international organization.

As Josef Hanc has put it: "Regional groupings will most certainly fail if they do not become affiliated to a universal organization. If they are to be successful, they must be linked with, and subordinate to, a world-wide international system designed to further political security and economic prosperity."¹

The growing importance of regionalism to the cause of world peace can be fully realised after carefully studying the existing regional arrangements. Besides the South East Asian Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact, which will be discussed in separate chapters, there are a number of regional groups of states in America, Europe and Asia. The most notable among them are the organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Arab League and the Pacific Defence Pact (ANZUS).

The American states were indeed in the fore front to draw provision for the common defence at the end of Second World War. At a conference held at Mexico city in 1945, they laid the foundation for the Rio Treaty and for the Organization of American States (OAS).

The Rio Treaty was signed in 1947 after a conference, which was held at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, for the maintenance of continental peace and security. The agreement provided "that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all American states and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective

I. Quoted in Palmer and Perkins, *International Relations*, p. 812.

self defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations ” This, in fact, is the gist of the whole treaty It provided a pattern in the drafting of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949

The Organization of American States came into being at the Ninth International Conference of American States held at Bogota, Colombia, in March—April 1948 In its form and structure, it bears a close resemblance to the United Nations The Charter of OAS has 18 chapters and 112 articles The organization has a Secretary General, who is elected for a ten year term and is not eligible for re election It has a secretariat resembling the secretariat of the United Nations Besides, it has a number of specialised organizations, such as the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science, the Pan American Institute of Geography and History and the Inter American Tele-Communications Office etc The OAS is automatically open to all American states who ratify the Charter

The OAS Council, which has its seat in Washington, D C , is very active The Council supervises and coordinates the work of Pan American Union and its secretariat In case of an armed attack within the area covered by the Rio Treaty or other inter-American arrangement, the Chairman of the Council is obligated to convene a meeting, for consultation, of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as well as of the Council itself

The peace machinery of OAS has proved very useful It has been invoked since 1948 in several disputes involving the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Haiti In each

Iceland, United States and Canada. In 1952, the NATO was extended to include Greece and Turkey. The members of the Treaty, although separated by the Atlantic Ocean, are, as Walter Lippmann puts it "closely connected with one another by geography, history and vital necessity". Primarily it was the fear of Soviet imperialism and serious doubt about the United Nations ability to provide adequate security which led to the formation of NATO. The Brussels Treaty, as noted above, grew out of similar fears and doubts. But NATO, unlike the Brussels Treaty, called for the establishment of a more effective and wider machinery to deal with an armed attack.

The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article V which states "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measure taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

Furthermore, the Treaty sets forth mutual obligations and calls for the elimination of conflicts among the members, for collaboration in economic matters and for self-help and mutual aid to develop their strength to resist aggression.

As regards its organizational structure, the North Atlantic Treaty provides for a Council to head the Treaty organization. The Council consists of ministers of foreign affairs, defence and finance, in particular, and permanent representatives from each of the member-states. As the activities of NATO expanded, the Council decided in 1952 to have a permanent international staff, headed by a Secretary General.

Apart from other committees and agencies, a Military Committee is of crucial importance in the planning of NATO. It is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the member countries and it heads the military organization. It advises the Council on military matters and provides general guidance for the Standing Group, which is a permanent full time agency consisting of special military representatives of the British, French and the United States Chiefs of Staff. There are several military commands, which are directly under, and responsible to, the Standing Group. The best known of these is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headed first by General Eisenhower, now President of the United States.

Another important point that deserves to be mentioned about the NATO is its relationship with the United Nations. The activities under both Article 51 and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter are comprehended in the North Atlantic

reaty, as article 5 and 7 of the Treaty provide that no collective action can be taken unless the Security Council fails to act. It does not mean that the Security Council is inactive. "The Treaty does not contradict the Charter but outside the scope", as former Secretary of State Warren Austin puts it.

To the Soviet Union and to the Eastern European countries, the regional pacts are a new step. They are tied together by a network of bilateral military alliances and economic treaties. Most of these bilateral military alliances are made in accordance with Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter. They provide for mutual assistance in case of armed attack by a former enemy state (principally Germany) among the European states and Japan on the one hand, alone or in alliance with other states. In these agreements when put together produce the same effect as a multilateral treaty.

1. The Soviet Union is bound by treaties of mutual assistance with the following states: Bulgaria (September 1, 1947); Poland (February 4, 1948); Czechoslovakia (February 24, 1948); Rumania (March 1, 1948); Hungary (July 24, 1948); People's Republic of China (October 1, 1948). The Soviet Union has also concluded similar treaties with the following states: Albania (November 27, 1947); Romania (December 8, 1947); Bulgaria (December 12, 1947); Hungary (January 18, 1948); Czechoslovakia (February 24, 1948); Poland (February 24, 1948); People's Republic of China (October 1, 1948). The Soviet Union has also concluded similar treaties with the following states: Albania (November 27, 1947); Romania (December 8, 1947); Bulgaria (December 12, 1947); Hungary (January 18, 1948); Czechoslovakia (February 24, 1948); Poland (February 24, 1948); People's Republic of China (October 1, 1948).

States. Obviously, the mutual jealousies among the Arab States have prevented the Arab League from becoming a strong and effective organization. In the United Nations, however, the Arab States, by such means as bloc voting and by cooperation with other Asian members, have been able to oppose the Western powers on many matters. Nevertheless, the Arab League remains a weak force unable to play a vital role in world politics.

On the other hand, a Pacific Defence Pact (ANZUS) between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, until the SFATO came into being, stood as an isolated example of regional arrangement in the Pacific. The background of the Pacific Pact will be discussed elsewhere. All that need be mentioned here is that in 1951 the United States, alarmed by the communist gains in Asia, realized the need for "an overall system of Pacific Ocean collective security pacts." The United States entered into such pacts with the Philippines, with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand separately. These pacts are defensive in nature.

A discussion of the free world's regional arrangements of various types clearly shows that they are derogatory neither to the national sovereignty of a member-country nor to the international authority of the United Nations. On the other hand their existence, as John Foster Dulles put it, "marks a significant step in the long overdue progress of international society from anarchy to order."

2

PAKISTAN IN PERSPECTIVE

Nothing does more to determine a nation's foreign policy and to shape her vital interests in regional pact than the dictates of geography. As the French diplomatist Jules Cambon said, geography is the "principal factor in diplomacy." It determines a nation's power position, whether she is secure or insecure, whether she can maintain a large fighting force, whether she can exist side by side with a powerful and aggressive neighbour, and whether she can become economically strong by developing her natural resources.

The unique position which Pakistan occupies in Asia at present is mainly due to her geographic and strategic situation. Its sprawling territory is divided into two parts, separated by a 1000-mile long stretch of the Indian land mass. West Pakistan, which includes the former provinces of Sind, West Punjab, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province, as well as tribal territories, has an area of 310,236 square miles and a population well over 33.8 million. The density of population varies considerably in West Pakistan. There are, for instance, 259 persons to the square mile in the former West Punjab area, while there are just 8.8 persons to the square mile in the vast arid region of

Baluchistan. The entire region is generally arid, and its agricultural economy is sustained by an extensive network of irrigation canals

West Pakistan has common borders with Iran, Afghanistan and Chinese Turkistan. It is separated from Soviet Central Asia by a tongue of Afghan territory which is nowhere more than 50 miles in width. The shortest distance between the borders of West Pakistan and the Soviet Union is less than one hundred miles. Tashkent, an important city in Soviet Central Asia, is about 500 miles from Peshawar and 1000 miles from Karachi, the capital of Pakistan. The famous historic land route, the Khyber Pass, forms an integral part of West Pakistan. It is this pass through which the sub continent was invaded, in the past, by conquerors like Cyrus, Alexander the Great, Mahmud of Ghazna, Timur, Babar, Nadar Shah and Ahmed Shah Abdali. Again, it was through this pass that the Russian invasion of the sub continent was feared by the British in the 19th century.

The eastern wing of Pakistan, which is a semi tropical area extending over 54,501 square miles, is situated at the head of the Bay of Bengal. Although in area East Pakistan is much smaller than West Pakistan, it has a large population—42 million, and it has nearly 777 persons per square mile. It is almost surrounded by India although on its south eastern fringes it runs parallel to Burma. It is not very far from where the Japanese advance was halted in the Second World War. Beyond Burma lie Siam and Indo China. The Indo Chinese frontier is less than 500 miles from East Pakistan, that of Siam is even less. From Dacca, Kunming and Bangkok are each 1000 miles.

This unique geographic situation has created serious economic and transportation problems for Pakistan. It has also impeded the economic integration of the two zones. But it was inescapable, for only in this way could the two predominantly Muslim areas in the sub-continent join forces to create an independent Muslim state.

While outlining Pakistan's geographic location as a factor to be reckoned with in the formation of any global policy, it is imperative to take note of the forces which led to the creation of this state. These forces stemmed directly from developments in British India, in the last century. Indirectly, however, the evolution of these forces can be traced back to the 8th. century, which marks the advent of the Muslim sailors into Sind under the leadership of Mohammad Bin Qasim, who conquered most of the Indus Valley. But it was not until the 11th. century that the Turkish or Afghan dynasties, also known as the Pathan Kings, began administering India from the outpost of Delhi. That rule lasted for nearly 340 years and shaped the present map of the sub-continent.

In 1526, the Moguls took over from the Pathans as the ruler of India and their rule extended over 200 years. In 1707, with the death of Emperor Aurangzeb, the Mogul Empire began waning. Simultaneously the British, French and Dutch settlements on the coasts waxed strong. Soon the British East India Company routed her rivals in military encounters and then turned against the Hindu and Muslim states. In 1757, Clive, an English adventurer in the service of the East India Company, inflicted a military defeat on the ruler of Bengal. After that several Muslim and Hindu states

local boards and district councils would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations. So long as differences of race and creed, and distinctions of caste form an important element in the socio-political life of India, and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country at large, the system of election, pure and simple, cannot be safely adopted. The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community, and the ignorant public would hold Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever."¹

By 1905, when it was expected that Great Britain would extend the scope of political reforms, the Muslims who were largely backward were convinced that they should receive special protection as a minority. In 1906, they formally asked the British Government for a separate electorate, so that they should be able to elect their own representatives to the elected bodies.

On this issue they were unable to reach agreement with the Caste Hindus dominating the Indian National Congress. Many Muslim leaders, therefore, quit the Congress and formed the Muslim League. Eventually, Great Britain conceded the principle of separate electorate, which was incorporated in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. But these reforms were merely an eye-wash, since the franchise was limited and the elected representatives got a shadow rather

1. Sir Ronald Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Vol. I, appendix II, London 1942.

than a substance of power. The subsequent British reforms of 1919 and 1935 also failed to satisfy either the Muslim League or the Indian National Congress. The deteriorating pattern of Hindu Muslim relations led to communal riots, which threw the sub continent into convulsion.

At long last the Muslims realized that, as an unalterable and perpetual minority, their economic position would worsen. They began to think in different terms and clearly visualised that freedom from British rule would mean practically nothing to them, unless it brought freedom from the tightening grip of Hindu domination also. After the passing of the Government of India Act of 1935, which recognized Indian independence as an ultimate goal, the Muslim League became more virile.

At its annual session in Lahore in 1940, it adopted that famous historic resolution which charted its future course of action by stipulating that "no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

This resolution, which later came to be known as the "Pakistan Resolution", was strongly opposed by the Hindus, who deprecated it as unrealistic and impracticable. It is, however, interesting to note that many

prominent Hindu leaders, such as Lala Lajpat Rai and Savarkar, had suggested the partition of India between Hindus and Muslims as early as 1924.

Nevertheless, by the time the Second World War broke out, the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan gained momentum. Due to the exigencies of war, the issue of Indian independence was temporarily shelved. But as soon as the war was over the British Government took steps to grant independence to the vast Indian sub-continent.

In March 1946, a three-man British Cabinet mission arrived in New Delhi to explore the possibility of resolving Hindu-Muslim differences as a preliminary to the transfer of power by Britain. The negotiations ultimately resolved round the setting up of an Interim Government, representative of both the Hindus and the Muslims, and a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for the 'Union of India.' At this time Great Britain favoured the idea of a United India in which Hindus and Muslim majority provinces would be autonomous except in matters of foreign policy, defence and communications. The provinces, however, could secede from the Union after ten years, if they wished to do so. The Muslim League took the position that if Muslim interests could be safeguarded by this proposal, it would agree to join the Interim Government. Mohammad Ali Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan since it contained the "germs of Pakistan", as he declared in July 1946. The Congress did not agree to this Plan. On June 26 she accepted the constitution-making part of the plan but refused to join the Interim Government. The Cabinet Mission then adjourned; meanwhile, the

Viceroy formed a 'Caretaker Government' of civil servants. The Muslim League regarded this as a breach of promise by the Viceroy that the Plan would be proceeded with if either party accepted. The League, therefore, not only withdrew the acceptance of the proposal, but decided on a campaign of 'Direct Action' to achieve Pakistan.

At last it was admitted by the Congress and the British Government that they could not force the Muslim majority provinces to remain within India against the wishes of their people. Therefore, on June 3, 1947, the British Government accepted the principle of partition and declared that it would grant full dominion status to India and Pakistan on 14th August, with the implicit right to secede from the Commonwealth.

With the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, the Muslim demand for an independent state, where they could develop their religion and culture, was fulfilled. But, as the late Sardar Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister of India put it, few could realise "the bitterness and sorrow that partition has brought to those who cherished unity."¹

Therefore, one of the first important tasks that confronted Pakistan was to establish friendly relations with India. But it was not an easy task by any means. Many disputes between India and Pakistan, which arose as a legacy of partition, bedevilled their relations. The major dispute related to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was the result of the same historical

¹ Quoted in Andrew Mellor *India since Partition* London 1947, pp 42-43

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¹ Quoted in Andrew Mallor, *India since 1947*, pp 42-43

the United Nations After hearing charges and counter-charges from India and Pakistan, the Security Council decided that the best way to stop fighting in Kashmir would be to assure the contending elements that a fair and impartial plebiscite would be held under the United Nations' auspices to determine the future of the State The mediatory efforts of the United Nations Commission led to the ceasefire, which took effect on January 1, 1949 India and Pakistan also accepted the Commission's two resolutions providing for a free and impartial plebiscite under the United Nations' auspices

But difficulties arose about the demilitarization of the State, preparatory to a plebiscite Dr Frank Graham, U N Mediator, who succeeded Sir Owen Dixon, had suggested that 3000 to 6000 troops might be kept on the Pakistan side and 12000 to 18000 on the Indian side of the cease fire line This proposal was rejected by India but accepted by Pakistan

At the persuasion of the United Nations however, India agreed to the proposal for direct negotiations with Pakistan The only outcome of the direct negotiations was that the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, after their talks at New Delhi in August 1953, issued a joint communique, which reaffirmed that the people of Kashmir should be allowed to exercise their right of self determination and that the "most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite" It was also agreed that the Plebiscite Administrator shall be appointed by the end of April 1954
A joint committee of experts should deal with

related issues. But nothing of this sort happened, and the dispute dragged on.

On November 17, 1956, when the Kashmir Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution which provided for the merger of the state with India, Pakistan turned again to the United Nations to seek a solution of the dispute. The Security Council on January 24, 1957 reminded the Governments concerned that the final disposition of state "will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations." It was also reaffirmed by the Security Council that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly cannot in any way change this position. In spite of the Council's resolution calling for the maintenance of the *status quo*, the Srinagar Assembly passed an act of accession according to which Kashmir became an integral part of India. The Security Council condemned this act. Moreover, it would not be irrelevant to point out here, that the Soviet Union, on February 21, 1957, voted a resolution that provided for the stationing of a U.N. Police Force in Kashmir in order to facilitate a free and impartial plebiscite. As a result the Kashmir dispute continued to disturb Indo-Pakistan relations.

Besides the Kashmir dispute, the mass migration from both sides, after partition was another cause of tension between the two countries. Over seven million Muslims entered Pakistan from India, while nearly five million Hindus and Sikhs crossed the West Pakistan border. As a result of this mass evacuation and influx, problems relating to evacuee property and abducted women were created. These problems fanned

more ill feeling between the people of the two countries. On top of all this comes the Indus Basin waters dispute which is full of dangerous potentialities. It is as grave as the Kashmir dispute. West Pakistan's very existence depends on the historic withdrawals from rivers and canals which pass through India. David E. Lilienthal, head of the famous Tennessee Valley Authority, later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who made an extensive tour of the Indus Basin in 1951, noted "Pakistan includes some of the most productive food growing lands in the world in Western Punjab (the Kipling country) and the Sind. But without water for irrigation this would be desert, 20,000,000 acres would dry up in a week, tens of millions would starve. No army with bombs and shell fire could devastate a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and the people of Pakistan alive."

West Pakistan is a region of deficit rainfall. Its agrarian economy depends on the irrigation system of the Indus Basin. After partition India proceeded with schemes for building great storage dams at Bhakra and Nangal on the upper reaches of the river Sutlej. These dams will take the entire flow of Sutlej and will irrigate areas outside the Indus Basin, such as Rajputana. Pakistan maintains that as its economy is dependent on these rivers, it is entitled to an equitable apportionment of these waters. It further holds that according to international law as applied to international rivers, such as the Danube and the Nile, it is not only

1 David E. Lilienthal "Are We Starting Another Korea", *Collier's* August 4, 1951,

entitled to receive perennial water-supplies on the basis obtaining before partition, but also to a share in the subsequent increases effected by engineering works. In 1952 India reduced the supply of water to Pakistan. Pakistan suggested to India that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, by whose award both parties to the dispute should faithfully abide. But India did not agree to this.¹

However, in 1954 the conciliatory efforts of the World Bank's President, Eugene Black, led to a provisional agreement between India and Pakistan on the use of the Indus waters. The Bank suggested that Pakistan should have complete rights to the three western rivers—the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab—except for such uses as are made of them in Jammu and Kashmir, and India to the three eastern rivers—the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. The Bank also proposed that Pakistan should construct link-canals taking off from the western rivers to bring water to those canals which are at present fed by the eastern rivers, and that India should give Pakistan assistance in this development. Pakistan accepted these proposals pending a proper study of the question whether her needs could be satisfactorily met from the three western rivers allotted to her. The World Bank has since conceded that Pakistan's needs could not be possibly met out of the supplies available from the western rivers.

In fact, there was a basic geographical and hydrological flaw in the World Bank's plan to divide the rivers. Pakistan lacks good sites for building storage-

1. See *Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on "No War Declaration and the Canal Waters Dispute"*, Government of Pakistan Publication 1950, p. 19.

dams, most of which lie in Kashmir or India. The settlement of the Kashmir dispute is thus linked with that of the water dispute, for in Kashmir lies the hydrological control of the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab.¹

The Indus Basin water dispute becomes more and more serious as months and years go by and one growing season succeeds another, therefore, some speedy solution of the problem has got to be found. Since the rights to these waters have international sanction behind them, and are guaranteed by the Barcelona Convention India's unilateral action of diverting the rivers or curtailing the waters will be regarded by Pakistan as an act of aggression.

All these facts bear testimony to the tension between India and Pakistan. Pakistan is much smaller and weaker than India, in area, population, and natural resources. At the time of partition, India inherited a number of well established ordnance factories, while Pakistan got none. In view of all this there could be no question of Pakistan going to war with India. But the fear of aggression by India has always been present in Pakistan. Pakistan has, therefore, constantly sought for security and guarantee of her territorial integrity. The United Nations Charter does not provide these things. The Charter can be provoked in case of aggression. But the Security Council, as it has been noted in the introduction, can be prevented from taking action if one of the five permanent members casts a negative vote. Nor has the Commonwealth guaranteed the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

¹ Patrick Murphy, *Indus Basin Water*
wealth June 10, 1957, p. 573.

Pakistan, therefore, inevitably has felt the need for friends and allies,

Pakistan, it may be mentioned here, has, after independence, assumed the responsibility of guarding the Khyber Pass and defending the North West Frontier. This region has figured prominently in Russian strategy. Prior to World War II, Russia was Britain's antagonist in this part of the World for nearly a century. But during World War II there was no anxiety to defend this area because the Soviet Union, which might have threatened its safety, was in alliance with Britain. After 1947, the situation has changed. In fact, when the historical pattern of Soviet diplomacy reemerged in Europe, the question that presented itself to political observers was whether it would not reappear in other areas also in which Russia was traditionally interested.

Moreover, the rapid growth of new industries in Soviet Central Asia gave rise to the notion that the Soviet Union would feel a deep concern about her safety, and might also seek access to a port on the Arabian Sea. There is only one warm-water port which can serve the needs of Soviet Central Asia, and that is Karachi. "A railway line, running from the Hindu Kush on the Russian frontier by Herat and Qandhar to link with the Pakistan railway system, would encounter no obstacles save the river Helmand, till at Chaman, on the Pakistan border, the gauge is broken."¹

Not long ago it was reported that there were 25 Soviet and Chinese airfields fitted with radar along the

1. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, London, 1950, p. 301.

Pakistan border. Soviet surveyors were planning "one airfield beside Lake Mansorwar in Western Tibet, right on the border of Kashmir."¹ There were also reports that the Soviet Union has built railroads connecting points on the Afghanistan border with places in Soviet Turkestan.² For Pakistan, which could not defend the North West Frontier, as she was militarily weak, the outlook was depressing. On top of this the attitude of Afghanistan added a new element to the problem of frontier defence ✓

After 1947, Afghanistan put forward a demand for 'Pakhtoonistan', a hypothetical state to be created on the Pakistan side of the border between the two countries. 'Pakhtoonistan' was designed by Afghanistan to include the Tribal Territory with its two million inhabitants, the old North West Frontier Province of Pakistan with its three million inhabitants, and a part of the former Baluchistan Province of Pakistan. These parts of Pakistan territory, which have always been regarded vital for the security of the sub continent, are bounded on the north and west by the Durand Line—the international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, drawn in 1893 after the Second Afghan War.

The tribesmen living on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line have never thought of transferring their allegiance to Afghanistan. On the other hand, they have repeatedly pledged loyalty to Pakistan. In July 1947, on the eve of the establishment of Pakistan, a referendum was held in the North West Frontier

1 *The New York Times* September 5 1951

2 *Time* (Magazine) November 23, 1953

Province to ascertain whether the people wished to join Pakistan or India. Although at the time there was a Congress Ministry in power, an overwhelming majority voted to join Pakistan.

Nevertheless, after Pakistan was established, the Government of Afghanistan started making violent propaganda for 'Pakhtoonistan' in the Press and on the Radio. It even voted against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. "This unhappy circumstance is due to the fact", the Afghan representative Hosyan Aziz told the General Assembly, "that we do not recognize the North West Frontier Province as a part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North West Frontier Province have not been given an opportunity, free from any kind of influence, to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan."¹ Afghanistan was reminded about the referendum by which the people of that province had acceded to Pakistan. The Afghan Government gave the reply that the referendum could not be considered satisfactory because it did not provide the Pathans the choice to opt out for independence.

Pakistan kept drawing the attention of the Afghan Government to the treaty, voluntarily agreed to by Kabul in 1921 for non-interference in the affairs of the people living, on east of the Durand Line. But Afghanistan insisted that the Durand Line had ceased to have any validity after the withdrawal of the British forces from the subcontinent. Pakistan was unable to see the reason behind this argument because, as a successor state, she inherited all the obligations and

1. Quoted in *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Delhi, July 1955, p. 83.

rights under the treaties and agreements which previously the administration entered into with Afghanistan,

The Afghan claim to speak for the people living in the territory which is a part of Pakistan is based on the assumption that Pathans are akin to them racially and linguistically. This assumption is unwarranted. For one thing the current language of Afghanistan is not Pushto but Persian, which is also the court language of the State. And out of Afghanistan's 12 million, only three million are Pushto speaking Pathans, the rest being Hazaras, Nooristanis, Ghilzais, Uzbeks and Turkemans. The Turkemans, it should be noted, were conquered by Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. The river Oxus separates them from their kinsmen in the Soviet Union. The Russians have been trying to woo them so that they might be absorbed in their republics north of the Oxus.

|| In 1955, the Soviet Premier, Marshal Bulganin while on a visit to Kabul, publicly supported Afghanistan's demand saying 'We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the 'Pakhtoonistan' problem and think that Pushtos should be consulted on the solution of the problem'.¹ Perhaps the motive underlying the Russian support for 'Pakhtoonistan' was that the acceptance of such a claim on Pak-Afghan border would *ipso facto* lend substance to the Russian claim on the Turkeman populated areas of Afghanistan, bordering on the Turkeman Soviet Republic. The Soviet Union would thus be able to extend her frontier south of the Oxus, as was done by her in the Baltic States and with

1 *The Pakistan Times* Lahore May 11 1955

part of Finland, seventeen years ago.// Recently the Hindu Kush—the dread range of mountains sprawling right across Afghanistan—was described by the Soviet writers as “a road block on the invasion route to India.”¹ Therefore any trouble in the tribal area can be exploited by the Soviet Union to serve her own interests.

But it is gratifying to know that Pak-Afghan relations, since the Baghdad Pact came into being, have taken a turn for the better. In December 1956, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan paid a state visit to Pakistan. While in Karachi, he held talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In a joint communique issued at the end of their talks, the two Prime Ministers noted that their Governments would try to solve the ‘Pakhtoonistan’ problem through friendly discussions.² In June 1957, Prime Minister Suhrawardy visited Kabul “on a mission of peace”, as he himself put it. The Prime Minister’s visit paved the way for mutual understanding and goodwill. Besides, it smoothed the ground for an agreement on the subjects of trade, road and telecommunication which would be mutually beneficial. Except for ‘Pakhtoonistan’, there is nothing else that can stop the two countries from coming closer to each other.

Though lately the Pak-Afghan relations have improved, it does not mean that Pakistan should feel less concerned about the defence of her north-west frontier. A number of factors, already mentioned, explain Pakistan’s supreme need of security against any possi-

1. See John Cloms, “Pakistan’s Problem Neighbour”. *New Commonwealth*, March 7, 1955, pp. 217-18.

2. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, December 2, 1956.

ble attack from outside. It is a well known fact, as a writer puts it, that "the defence of Pakistan is important not only for its own sake but also for the sake of the defence of (a) India, and (b) Commonwealth communications. A possible Russian invasion of the Indo Pakistan sub continent can be effectively halted on Pakistan's mountain frontier, for there are no other natural barriers that can be of avail in stopping it. If the invader crosses that frontier, not only would it be comparatively easy for him to spread out over the entire sub continent, but he would also be able to reach the Indian Ocean seaboard. With access to that ocean, he could, if he were suitably equipped for it, play havoc with the shipping carrying vitally needed food and war supplies for the Commonwealth countries."

1 K Sarwar Khan, *Pakistan and the Commonwealth*
Karachi, 1-11-52

3

PAKISTAN AND THE GREAT POWERS

In a statement issued after the establishment of Pakistan, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan proclaimed: "I wish it to be clearly known abroad that Pakistan starts on its career without any narrow and special commitments and without any prejudices in the international sphere."¹ Was the late Prime Minister proclaiming neutrality by this declaration? Perhaps he was only asserting a desire to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Pakistan was born economically and militarily weak. She needed friends and allies who could render material aid and come to her succour in case of aggression. The fear of aggression was not unreal, because the forces which were opposed to the creation of Pakistan had not reconciled themselves to her existence.

Nevertheless, Pakistan started on her career independently, without being tied to the apron strings of any great power. In world affairs, Pakistan supported the cause which she thought was just. Moreover, she expressed her opinion openly and frankly on all international issues. On colonial matters, for instance, Pakistan boldly opposed the

1. Quoted in *Pakistan Horizon*, December, 1951, p. 184.

planes carrying war material that could be used against the Indonesian people were denied access to any airfield or port in Pakistan. Pakistan also lent her support to Iran against Britain over the question of nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

However, on many occasions, Pakistan sided with the Western Powers. She was one of the first countries to support the United Nations' police action to repel aggression when the communist Government of North Korea launched an attack on South Korea in 1950. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan described the attack as a grave threat to international peace and security and blamed the North Korean authorities for obstructing the task of the United Nations' Commission. Pakistan also advocated the policy of bringing the whole country under the occupation of the United Nations forces.

On the occasion of signing the Japanese peace treaty, Pakistan supported the United States' position. She strongly felt that there must be peace with Japan on the terms that had been agreed, otherwise Japan might share the fate of Korea and Germany.

In establishing diplomatic relations also Pakistan pursued an independent course. She was not influenced by considerations whether a country conformed to the western type of democracy or adhered to communism. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the communist Government of China and to establish diplomatic relations with her. Later, she supported Communist China's admission to the United Nations, hoping that this would avert the deadlock which threatened the function of the world organization. If in November 1956 Pakistan agreed with

the majority opinion in the Steering Committee of the General Assembly that China's admission to the United Nations should be deferred, it was not because of any antagonism towards Peking. This policy was largely dictated by the contingencies of international politics.

The concrete instances, mentioned above, clearly indicate that Pakistan never became a camp follower of any great power. Nor did she exercise antipathy towards any country unless provoked by unfriendly acts from some quarter. The main object of her foreign policy has been to establish friendly relations with all nations.

True, international politics have played an important role in determining relations between Pakistan and the Great Powers. When Pakistan came into being, the situation in Europe was greatly disturbed on account of Soviet Russia's intervention in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The state of affairs in Asia was no better. The civil war in China, which in the course of the next two years was to force Chiang Kai Shek out of the mainland, was threatening the peace and stability of South East Asia. After taking stock of the situation, the United States had started giving economic aid to war torn European countries in order to help them regain their badly impaired economic strength. Apart from this, the United States encouraged the free countries of Europe to safeguard their independence against the threat of aggression from Russia which had greatly expanded in the post war period. It was not until 1950, however, when the war in Korea began, that the attention of the western powers got focussed on South East Asia as ^{in a new} sense of urgency. For the first

between Pakistan and the Soviet Union, which went underway after the Soviet Vice-Premier Mikoyan's visit to Karachi, resulted in an agreement according to which the two countries offered each other the most favoured nation treatment. Pakistan agreed to export to the U S S R, among other things, jute and jute manufactures, cotton, wool, hides and skins, and tea. The U S S R imports to Pakistan include industrial equipment, tools and instruments, agricultural machinery, trader's chemicals, timber, etc.

The Soviet Union has also made offers of economic and technical aid to Pakistan. In 1956 Marshal Bulganin, replying to questions submitted by a Pakistani news agency, indicated his willingness to make available to Pakistan Soviet technical knowledge on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In addition, at the first Republic Day Reception in March 1956 at the Pakistan Embassy in Moscow, Foreign Minister Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would be willing to construct a steel mill in Pakistan as it had done in India¹. Obviously, no Soviet offer has materialized so far. But Pakistan, without taking the fact of aid or trade into consideration, is trying to maintain friendly relations with all the communist countries, particularly with the Soviet Union and China.

The relations between Pakistan and Communist China are more friendly as compared to Pakistan's relations with other communist powers. Perhaps the reason is that China had never tried to interfere in the affairs of Pakistan, particularly in the Kashmir issue. Apart from this, Pakistan and China have a long

¹ The Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 25, 1956.

a similar constitutional and legal system. They have similar conceptions of right and wrong, justice and fairplay. English is the common official language, through which the business of their governments is conducted, it, of course, provides another cementing force. A large number of Pakistanis, especially civil servants and officers of the armed forces, have received education and training in the United Kingdom. These Pakistanis and others, who form the hard core of intelligentsia in the country, cherish the same way of thinking and outlook on life which have been cultivated by the British through the ages. Besides, many British banks and business firms, which are operating in Pakistan, keep the people of this country in close touch with the West.

This pattern of relationship with Great Britain is also sustained by Pakistan's membership in the Commonwealth. She did not become a member of the Commonwealth by force of volition. After independence, she just found herself in the fold. It was a condition of the creation of Pakistan that she should start her career as a member of the Commonwealth. Pakistan had no difficulty in agreeing to this condition because membership in the Commonwealth was in no way derogatory to her sovereignty or independence.

Indeed, the Commonwealth is 'an association of free, equal and independent nations', linked together by common allegiance to the crown. The crown, represented in the person of the King or Queen is a mere legal abstraction and does not in any way 'imply the subordination of Pakistan to any outside power',¹

1 Report by the Federal Court of Pakistan on Special Reference No. 1 of 1955 made by the Governor General of Pakistan Lahore 1955 p. 64

Council decided upon a free and impartial plebiscite to be held under international supervision for determining the fate of Kashmir. India felt dissatisfied and asked for adjournment of the debate, which was granted. However, when the Security Council again met to resume discussion on the Kashmir question a resolution was passed providing for the holding of a plebiscite, but allowing India to remain in effective control of the disputed territory.

Following this many British ministers in their public utterances supported India's claim to the leadership of South East Asia. The people of Pakistan resented it. They reacted by demanding the elimination of British elements from the armed forces and civilian administrative positions.¹ Eventually the Government of Pakistan was forced to replace the British governors of provinces by Pakistanis. In April 1949, the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London announced that the future constitution of Pakistan would decide whether Pakistan should remain in the Commonwealth on the existing basis, or on the basis adopted by India, or should get out of it altogether.

Gradually an impression gained ground in Pakistan membership in the Commonwealth could not be of any use, unless the Commonwealth could settle between two of its members. The late Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, speaking to the Canadian Parliament in 1950, stated that the Commonwealth should aim at two things. First, it should give the new member a lead in establishing the brotherhood of men,

Richard Symonds *The Making of Pakistan* London 1949
170 171

as the Chief Justice of Pakistan put it. There are, however, no legal or supernatural bindings on the members of the Commonwealth. They are not even required to pursue a common policy in world affairs. Only the common desire for peace, progress and liberty, which is also the objective of the United Nations, binds the members of the Commonwealth together.

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1. See Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, London, 1949, pp. 170-171.

without any prejudice to race, creed or colour. Secondly, it should outlaw war, but use coercion as a method of settling disputes among its own members.¹ This was the new approach of the Government of Pakistan towards the Commonwealth. The British do not totally agree with this conception. They feel that the Commonwealth cannot settle disputes between its members because it does not have the coercive force or power.

In 1951, the Prime Minister of Pakistan refused to attend the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference unless the Kashmir issue was put on its agenda. To induce the Prime Minister of Pakistan to attend the Conference, Britain agreed to discuss the issue formally.

The Commonwealth Prime Minister's mediation failed, but their efforts did not go in vain. During the Conference the United States was kept in touch with the discussions that took place between the Prime Ministers. When the dispute again came up before the Security Council in December 1951, Great Britain and the United States submitted a draft resolution which aimed at the settling of differences between India and Pakistan [that were preventing the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. Since this resolution embodied the proposals discussed by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, it became evident that the Commonwealth could make a notable contribution in preserving peace and could give greater efficiency to the Charter of the United Nations.

Apart from this, the Commonwealth membership

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, *Pakistan — The Heart of Asia*, Cambridge, 1951, 121.

has been productive of some good in several other ways. In the field of economic cooperation, the advanced countries of the Commonwealth have been supplying technical and economic aid to Pakistan under the Colombo Plan. Pakistan being an under-developed country welcomes this aid which facilitates her material development. Under the Colombo Plan, the United Kingdom has made available to Pakistan loans for various purposes. This assistance is supplemented by the release of sterling balances. For instance, the Commonwealth Development Finance Company based in London contributed one million pounds sterling towards the capital required for the Sui Gas project. Another one million pounds sterling came from a British company, the Burma Oil Company. Besides a loan of five million pounds sterling made by the International Bank to complete this project was covered by a release from the United Kingdom's sterling contribution to the Bank. Lately, Britain has agreed to supply £ 210,000 worth of textile equipment for the Dacca Institute of Textile Technology in East Pakistan. Also under the Colombo Plan Technical Cooperation Scheme, a large number of Pakistani technicians have received training in the United Kingdom¹.

Canada, Australia and New Zealand have also provided valuable assistance to Pakistan under the same Plan. Canada, for instance, is helping to finance an aerial survey of West Pakistan and to build a cement factory in the Thal area. It is also assisting this country to purchase 600,000 sleepers for the railway tracks. Above all, there is the multipurpose

1 Lord Birdwood, *Britain's Role in Pakistan's Development*, Dawn Karachi August 14 1957

\$ 40,000,000 Warsak project, which is being executed with the technical and financial assistance of Canada.

This is Canada's largest Colombo Plan project in Pakistan. Canada so far has allocated to this project \$ 2,540,000 and the additional funds will be allocated as the project progresses. "The Canadian Government has also provided funds to other Pakistan projects like the Ganges-Kobadak Project (1,800,000 dollars); Shadiwal Canal Falls Hydro-Electric Project (25,000,000 dollars); Dacca-Chittagong Inter-connector (4,000,000 dollars); Khulna-Theran Plan (2,000,000 dollars) and commodity aid (1,000,000 dollars) providing several hundred tons of copper rods for the manufacture in Pakistan of transmission wires and cables."¹

No doubt, the Commonwealth helped Pakistan in carrying out her development programmes, but it has done practically nothing to strengthen the defences of Pakistan. At partition, Pakistan took over 150,000 troops and airmen out of a total of 420,000 in the Indian Army and Air Force. Therefore, Pakistan's armed services had to be considerably expanded. It was expected that the Commonwealth would guarantee Pakistan's territorial integrity and help her build up an invulnerable defences. But nothing of this sort was done, and Pakistan felt disposed to look to the United States for military assistance.

The United States was one of the first countries to recognise Pakistan. Pakistan, therefore, reciprocated with more than the usual degree of goodwill

1. M. Anwar Arif, "Canada Today", *Dawn*, Karachi, July 1, 1957.

and friendliness towards the United States. In 1950, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States at the invitation of President Harry Truman. The tour was a great success as it strengthened the bonds of friendship between Pakistan and the United States. In 1951, following the Prime Minister's visit, the United States started giving economic and technical aid to Pakistan under E C A, Point Four and other programmes. Pakistan welcomed the economic aid because, after having remained under the colonial rule for so long, she had to strengthen herself economically and raise the living standard of her poverty stricken masses. The American aid programme to Pakistan has totalled \$528,973,810 or approximately Rs 2,500,000,000 over the past six years. The idea underlying this aid programme was that there could be no peace in the world until every nation was free and strong.

In 1954, Pakistan was in need of extra financial assistance, to accelerate her defence programme as well as to lower the prices of essential commodities. She, therefore, requested the United States to increase the amount and scope of aid. The United States agreed to Pakistan's request and the amount of American project and non project aid was raised to almost \$100,000,000 per year.

In this aid programme, beginning with 1951, the development of agriculture has been given top priority. For instance, in July 1952 the United States provided \$10,000,000 for financing specific projects of rural development. Pakistan contributed an equivalent amount in rupees. One outstanding project, for which \$2,39,000 out of this sum

were earmarked, related to the rural agricultural-industrial development programme. This programme was expected to affect 600,000 persons in approximately 1000 villages, during the five years of its operation.¹ Besides, several other big projects are being executed on the Indus Basin and in East Pakistan with the help of American experts.

The programme of industrial development is also being pushed up with American economic and technical aid. For instance, for the construction of Pakistan's first fertilizer plant at Daudhkhel the International Cooperation Administration has allocated \$13 million, which constitutes three fourth of the entire cost. A multi-purpose project at Karnaphuli (upstream from Chittagong) has also received aid worth \$12 million from the International Cooperation Administration.

On the whole, there are 67 development projects in which the Government of Pakistan and the United States are now jointly engaged. These projects aim at making Pakistan self-sufficient in various sectors of economy. As economic development is a long term process, conspicuous results cannot be expected immediately, but they will definitely appear in due course of time.

Apart from giving economic aid under various programmes, the United States has never hesitated to come to the rescue of Pakistan whenever she was overtaken by a crisis in the wake of a famine or flood. In 1951-52, when Pakistan was threatened with crop failure, the Export-Import Bank in Wa-

1. *Department of State Bulletin*, July 14, 1952. p.63.

shington immediately provided a loan of \$15 million with interest at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ per annum for the purchase of wheat. Again in 1953, Pakistan was confronted with a severe famine due to crop failure caused by severe drought. The United States immediately gave a generous gift of one million tons of wheat. The wheat gift was not an isolated gesture of the United States friendship. In 1954 when East Pakistan was overwhelmed by the worst floods in its history the United States rushed 50,000 to 60,000 lbs of medical supplies for the flood victims. In addition, it despatched a team of experts to control the spread of epidemics.

Coming to the Kashmir question, the United States has constantly supported the demand for an impartial plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations. In 1949, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee made a joint appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to come to an agreement over the Kashmir problem by accepting arbitration on outstanding differences.

The former American Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace A. Hildreth, had also repeatedly endorsed the view that the Kashmir problem should be settled in accordance with the United Nations' principles. Moreover, on March 6, 1957, he stated that his country supported Pakistan in the Security Council on Kashmir case not because of friendship or treaty alliances but above all for the sake of justice and righteousness¹.

A joint communique, issued on July 12, 1957 at the end of Prime Minister Suhra-

¹ *Dawn*, Karachi March 7, 1957.

wardy's talks with President Eisenhower, made special mention of Kashmir and the Canal Water dispute that have been threatening peace and stability in a strategic area of the world. Though the communique left much unsaid, "it ought not be assumed", to quote a Pakistani newspaper, "that things omitted from print were also necessarily omitted from the minds of the two leaders." ¹ President Eisenhower has expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute "may be solved speedily, equitably and permanently in accordance with the principles of the United Nations."

The reaction of the American press and public opinion towards the Kashmir problem has usually been one of sympathy for Pakistan's stand. For instance, commenting on Gunnar Jarring's mission, the *New York Times* wrote: "When Sweden's representative to the Security Council goes to India and Pakistan to see what he can do about the Kashmir case he will be confronted by a just concluded 'election' in Kashmir. He is no doubt wise enough not to be misled by this fiasco. What happened is no credit to India, no reflection of sentiment among the Kashmiris and no contribution to a solution of this thorny problem." ²

The exchange of visits between the leaders of Pakistan and the United States respectively have also contributed a great deal in bringing the two countries closer. In 1952-53, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, John Foster Dulles, and Vice-President Richard Nixon visited

1. *Dawn*, July 15, 1957.

2. *The New York Times*, March 8, 1957.

Pakistan Back in the United States they introduced Pakistan to their countrymen as a dependable friend in Asia In December 1953 when Vice President Nixon was in Pakistan, he pledged in an informal talk that the United States will in future stand by Pakistan to develop it industrially and in protecting it from forces that may threaten to destroy it ¹

Earlier, in September 1953, Pakistan's Governor General Ghulam Mohammed and the Commander in Chief had paid a visit to Washington D C Their talks with the State Department officials raised speculations in the world press, particularly in the Indian press, that the United States was negotiating for air bases in Pakistan in return for military aid. The report was described by the American and Pakistani officials as unfounded. But they made no secret of the fact that Pakistan was looking for American military aid, similar to the aid given to Turkey, within the framework of the United States Mutual Security Legislation

In spite of categorical assurances by the Pakistan Prime Minister that negotiations with the United States were proceeding for obtaining military assistance and there was no talk of leasing bases to America, the Soviet Union delivered a strong note of protest to the Government of Pakistan It alleged, *inter alia* -
"The Soviet Government could not regard with indifference reports of negotiations between the United States and Pakistan concerning the establishment of American air bases in Pakistan nor reports that Pakistan and U. S Governments were negotiating on the question of Pakistan joining in plans to set up a military aggressive bloc in the

1. Dawn Karachi December 9 1953

Middle East.”¹ In its reply to the Soviet Union, the Government of Pakistan reiterated that no negotiations for air bases on her soil were being conducted with the United States and assured that “it would not take any step in hostility or unfriendliness to the U. S. S. R.”² But, to safeguard her interests and security, Pakistan insisted, she would adopt and take such measures as might be deemed necessary and appropriate by her. That did not, however, carry conviction with the Soviet Union. On March 29, 1954, she sent to the Pakistan Charge’d Affaires in Moscow a second note of protest, stating that the grant of military bases to the United States and the “including of Pakistan in the military bloc which is the tool of the aggressive forces of imperialism” would harm Soviet-Pakistan relations.³ It was difficult to appreciate how the acceptance of military aid from the United States could by itself harm Soviet-Pakistan relations. After all, Pakistan as a sovereign state had the right to secure military aid from any country of her choice.

The main opposition to the Pakistan-U.S. negotiations for military aid came from India. The Prime Minister of India declared in the House of the People on December 19, 1952 that such aid would reverse the process of Asian liberation, because when military aid was given freely it led to colonialism. He further asserted: “No country

1. *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, 19 Nov - 2 Dec. 1953, p. 770.

2. *Dawn*, Karachi, December 20, 1953.

3. *Chronology of International Events and Documents* March 18—31, 1954, p. 220.

received free military aid without certain consequences following it. It is a very serious thing. It means that the cold war is coming to India's border. It means that if a hot shooting war developed, it would be right up to the borders of India." ¹ India's opposition to U.S. Military aid to Pakistan was motivated by the apprehension that it would give a set back to the cult of neutrality and many Asian states would follow Pakistan's example. Further, India feared that with the help of the proposed aid Pakistan would become so strong that she would be able to back, by force of arms, the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan assured the Indian leaders that "Pakistan has no policy or design of an aggressive kind whatsoever against any country." Pakistan's negotiations with the United States for military aid were actuated only by Pakistan's desire to strengthen her defences. ² In spite of this the All India Congress Committee, under the leadership of Nehru, passed a resolution urging the United States to desist from giving military aid to Pakistan. The opposition of Nehru to Pakistan U.S. Military Pact was hardly just or reasonable because he is well aware that a militarily strong Pakistan could be a bulwark for the security of India. However, a well known Indian journal, the *Eastern Economist* belonging to Birla, who is closely associated with Nehru's Party, wrote in its issue of December 26, 1952 "Unlike the Communist wars now being fought in Korea, Vietnam and Malaya, an attack on India cannot be localised. In effect, therefore, the

1 See Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan India and the United States, *Pakistan Horizon* December 1953 p 177

2 *Dawn* Karachi January 21 1954

North-Western gateway will need to be defended as well as the North-East. Russian troops can be thrown against Afghanistan and brought to India and Pakistan's frontier within two days. There is at present time no defence at the Khyber Pass, which can ever fight a long delaying action. Russian motorised columns could arrive in the Punjab within one week of declaration of war....At the same time there would be a Chinese attack to meet in the Assam area and possibly in Manipur. Again there could be no effective resistance in Pakistan. A major defensive operation now that India and Pakistan are separate - could only be organised behind the Padma in Bengal [East Pakistan] and behind the Sutlej in the Punjab [West Pakistan]."

In April, 1954, Pakistan and the United States, despite the opposition of India and the Soviet Union, entered into a military pact. It marked the beginning of a new chapter in their relations. The United States, according to this pact, agreed to make available to Pakistan equipment and technical assistance for strengthening her armed forces. In return Pakistan was obliged not to use the military assistance for any aggressive purposes. Apart from this, Pakistan accepted no other obligation. Addressing the Parliament in May 1954, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali stated: "the idea underlying Pakistan's acceptance of military aid was not to get involved in any war but to build up defences in order to preserve Pakistan's integrity and sovereignty."¹

The acceptance of military aid could not be taken to mean that Pakistan became subservient to

1. *Pakistan News Digest*, Karachi, April 1, 1954.

the United States or turned into a camp follower of the western bloc. Soon after the signing of the Pakistan U S Military Pact, Foreign Minister Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan rightly remarked in the course of an interview with an American journalist "Certain values that we share, we shall continue to share, where our policies or objectives differ, we shall continue to differ. If the feeling of sharing together deepens there will be greater accord. If the field of conflict of values or objectives persists, or unfortunately becomes wider, there will be less accord."¹

Pakistan was not expected by the United States to change her policies in the international field. Earlier the Ambassador of the United States in Pakistan, Horace A. Hildreth, had declared in unambiguous terms that "Pakistan by accepting military aid from the United States does not go into the Anglo American camp, she may even adopt a neutral attitude, if she chose, in a third world war."² There was, of course, no question of accepting the policy of neutrality by Pakistan. In the words of Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan "The possibility of remaining neutral does not depend merely upon the desire of a people or a government. Left to themselves no people or government would wish to invite the miseries and horrors of war in their own areas. Should, however, a conflict between the Great Powers become unavoidable, the choice of neutrality might become an illusion."³

1 *Dawn* Karachi April 13 1954

2 *Ibid.*, April 1 1954

3 *Ibid.*, April 13 1954

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PAKISTAN AND SEATO

Since Pakistan had rejected the policy of neutrality, it was, therefore, natural that she should join hands with the West in maintaining international peace and security. Five months after the signing of the Mutual Assistance Agreement with the United States for economic and military aid, Pakistan became a signatory to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In doing so, Pakistan's main objective was to deter countries which might have aggressive designs against her, and to ensure peace and stability in South-East Asia. It is a region in which, as has been already pointed out, Pakistan has vital interests. East Pakistan coastline, opening on the waters that separate the Pacific from the Indian ocean, lies close to Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indo-China. These countries are Pakistan's first line of defence against an attack from the East. In the last World War, it was only after the Japanese had acquired control of Siam and Indo-China that their conquest of Burma became possible and they made Burma the base for land attack on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

Besides, Pakistan has economic and cultural interests in South-East Asia. For, there are large number of Muslims living in this area. Their welfare is a matter of concern to the people of Pakistan. Econo-

omically, the countries of South-East Asia are large producers of food and raw materials for export. Burma's traditional surpluses of rice help to meet recurrent food shortages in East Pakistan. Burma also exports teak to Pakistan and imports Pakistan's jute and cotton. On Pakistan's import-schedule copra and coconut oil from Indonesia and the Philippines occupy a prominent place. If these countries were to come under communist domination, it is not certain what trade policy they would follow. They might just confine their trade to the communist bloc. Though that is a remote possibility, the threat can well upset the economic equilibrium that now exists in the area and hamper the present efforts to raise living standards under a democratic dispensation. The imposition of communist rule in these countries, whether by force or by subversion, would endanger the independence of Pakistan and disturb the *status quo* of the rest of Asia.

In fact, since the end of the Second World War, South-East Asia has been facing increasing tension. The revolutionary movements that have taken place in this region have a deep impact on the economic life of Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. In the case of Burma, by peaceful means. In the case of Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Malaya, these movements have been brought under Western domination. The threat of communist domination as well as the danger of civil war are also being faced by the governments of all these countries.

Moreover, the communist movement in the 1949 country has been increasing. In the London Times, it is stated that the balance of world power is being shifted.

ways it was greater in its cumulative effect than the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, for then Russia was alone and weak, whereas the mass of China is now added to a Russia grown strong.”¹ For some time, however, the ideological position of the Chinese Communists remained obscure. But soon they developed the “New Democracy” based on the writings of Mao Tse-tung, Marx and Lenin. The Russians recognised the Chinese type of communism as a suitable doctrine for Asian nations. Besides, Russia and China entered into a Thirty-Year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 15, 1950, which provided that in the event of an attack on either of the signatories by Japan or a state allied with it, and the one signatory being involved in state of war, the other party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal. Preceding this agreement, Peking had invited a conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Australasia in December 1949. It established a permanent Liaison Bureau to undertake the coordination of communist activities in Asia. Commenting on this conference, the London *Economist* had observed: “This communist offensive is directed not only against the survival of Western sovereignties in the East such as British rule in Malaya—but also against all those Asian leaders from India eastward to the Philippines who have been trying to base the policies of their respective countries on friendly relations with the West.”²

These developments alarmed the free countries of Asia and the world. It was feared that the Chinese

1. *The Times*, London, May 17, 1954.

2. Quoted in *Dawn*, Karachi, December 11, 1949.

communists, after consolidating their position at home, would like to extend the influence of their ideology. In doing this, they would be motivated partly by the desire to control the raw materials of the area and partly by the anxiety to ensure China's own security. The desire to control the raw materials may be less potent than the need to assure China's security. The Chinese Government claims that she is surrounded by enemies, who are anxious to overthrow her. The Chinese Government would, therefore, like to see the establishment of communist governments in the neighbouring countries. So long as this is not possible, the Chinese Government would employ all the means at her disposal to attain at least the benevolent neutrality of its neighbours.

History brings testimony to the fact that the Chinese Empire, when strong, forced her neighbours to owe allegiance to her. Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Siam, Burma, Tibet, Nepal and even Malaya and parts of Indonesia were all at one time or another within the sphere of Chinese influence. There seems no reason why the Chinese will not follow this historic pattern. In present times the Soviet Union, in order to ensure her military and political security, has successfully surrounded herself with satellites. It can be expected that the Chinese Government would do the same to protect her border from undesirable contacts.

To establish such a satellite system, they need not resort to war. The revolution in South East Asia, as the Chinese communists believe, is being so, all they need to do is to give

to subversive movements aimed at overthrowing established governments. The possibility of using force, however, cannot be entirely ruled out. If it seems to China that her vital interests are endangered, she may well take forceful action. This has already been seen in Korea, where the Chinese entered to stop the advance of U.N. forces towards the important hydro-electric works on the Yalu river, which supply power to the Manchurian industries. But any war is likely to increase China's dependency on the Soviet Union. Apart from the communist movement, the most probable course for the Chinese communists to pursue in South-East Asia would be to give support to the pro communist and neutral regimes, wherever they exist.

The Chinese minorities in South-East Asia, who maintain a close contact with their families in China and remit to them money from time to time may serve as useful tools in the hands of the Chinese communists to realise their aims in the region. The overseas Chinese, since the end of Second World War, have been taking great interest in politics. The communist activities among them had expanded when the communist regime was formally established in Peking. There is a considerable Chinese element in the Indonesian Communist Party, IPK. In the Philippines and Malaya, it was reported, the Chinese had actively assisted the communist rebels. There is no doubt that the overseas Chinese, in whom the Government of China is already taking great interest, are likely to play an important part in determining relations between China and the countries of South-East Asia. In April 1955, an agreement was signed at Bandung by the Foreign Ministers of China and

Indonesia which provided that all those who held both Chinese and Indonesian nationality were to choose one or the other within two years. But it should be noted that no such agreement has been made with Siam, which has a relatively larger Chinese minority than Indonesia.

These developments led to the canvassing of plans for the defence of South East Asia. Before the Second World War the need for a joint system of defence for this area was not considered necessary as British naval power backed by a strong British army extended from Karachi to Singapore and Hong Kong. France and Holland looked after the defences of Indochina and Indonesia, respectively, while the United States was responsible for the security of the Philippines. It was only when Japan struck southward that a South East Asia Command came into being, but then it was too late to defend the whole area. Britain, France and Holland the imperial powers in South East Asia, were heavily involved in Europe and Africa. Nevertheless, South East Asia command persisted, it directed the liberation of Burma, while the Japanese were collapsing before the American assault in the Pacific.

After the war a number of conferences, aimed at forming a regional association for Asian countries were held. The Asian Relations' Conference, which met in New Delhi in March 1947, was the first of the series. Ostensibly, it was a non official gathering convened under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs for the discussion of common Asian problems. The Prime Minister of India played a leading role in organising this conference, which was attended by delegates from thirty one Asian states, if the delegates from the Soviet Republics are in- d

separately. The common enemy of Asian states at that time was colonialism. Naturally, therefore, they discussed such topics as imperialism, democracy and economic development. A suggestion was even made to form a bloc of Asian countries which would neither take part in a war nor supply raw materials to the belligerents. But it was not possible to put this proposal into effect. There was distrust and rivalry among Asian states. Some of them feared the expansion of China; others of India. As a delegate from Burma had occasion to observe: "It was terrible to be ruled by a western power, but it was even more so to be ruled by an Asian power."¹ The Conference, on the whole was a failure because it accomplished nothing tangible.

The second conference of Asian states was to be held at Hangchow in China, but this plan failed to materialise due to the rising storm of revolution in that country. Nevertheless, another conference of Asian States was again convened in New Delhi after the Netherlands attacked the Indonesian Republic, in December 1948. Unlike the Asian Relations' Conference, it was an official gathering limited to the representatives of recognised governments. Another significant feature of this Conference was that the communist countries were not invited to it. Nor were the Western powers asked to attend because, as Nehru said, "their participation would have converted this conference into something different from what it was intended to be."² The Conference passed a resolution against Dutch imperialism and colonialism. Apart

1. Werner Levi, *Free India in Asia* Minneapolis, 1952, p.38.

2. New Delhi, Radio Broadcast of January 14, 1949.

from this it called upon the delegates to explore "ways and means of establishing suitable machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, for promoting consultation and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations". The Conference was definitely instrumental in influencing the eventual settlement of the Dutch Indonesian dispute. But the resolution on the establishment of regional machinery was never executed. The Prime Minister of India revealed some of the difficulties in the way of regional association when, in a speech to the Indian Parliament on March 8, 1949, he said "We have not yet decided as to what region that cooperation should relate to. India is interested in several regions of Asia and whether all of these should be grouped together or dealt with separately is still to be considered". He laid down "two conditions for any kind of regional grouping in which India would participate (1) It must be wholly within the scope and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and (2) it must be largely confined to consultation and cooperation with no binding covenant in it".¹ Obviously India wanted to have a loose regional association, which could not be very useful.

However, the earliest proposal for the defence of South East Asia owes its origin to President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines and Chiang Kai shek. After a meeting in Baguio, in July 1949, they pointed to "the gravity of the communist menace", and called on the countries of the Far East to "organise themselves into a Union for the purpose of achieving

1 Quoted in Palmer and Perkins *International Relations* pp 804 5

solidarity and mutual assistance to contain and counteract that communist threat.”¹ Though it was not suggested, it was obvious that the Conference wished to associate the United States in such an undertaking. This desire was implicit in President Quirino’s address to the United States’ Senate in August 1949: “Today the most urgent problem that confronts the Philippines and the other free countries of Asia is the problem of security ...No one who realises the extent of the menace to which Asia is exposed...can well afford to rest at ease now that the North Atlantic Pact is in full force and effect. Asia with its vast population... and with its incalculable resources, cannot and ought not be lost to communism by default.”²

President Quirino’s plan was endorsed by President Syngman Rhee of South Korea. But many Asian countries frowned at it, because they felt they were not in danger of going communist. Despite conspicuous lack of support, President Quirino decided to call a conference to discuss the problem of Asian unity. In order to induce the Asian countries to attend the Conference, he was obliged to modify the terms of reference. Military motive of the Conference was not mentioned at all; its scope was limited to economic, social and cultural questions. Nationalist China and South Korea were not invited. Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines participated in the Conference, which was held at Baguio, in May 1950. The Asian delegates were willing to discuss anything, but they were opposed to the proposal to create a common front

1. *The New York Times*, July 12, 1949.

2. *Ibid.*

against communism The Conference concluded after few days of indecisive discussions

The Philippines, nevertheless, continued to support the idea of a defence organization for the Pacific in which the United States' participation was considered essential Australia and New Zealand shared the Philippines' interest, for these three countries feared a resurgent Japan, and sought guarantee against the renewal of aggression from that quarter To some extent these countries succeeded in their objective To induce them to sign the peace treaty with Japan, the United States sponsored in 1951 "an overall system of Pacific Ocean Collective Security Pacts" Three pacts of mutual defence were concluded separately with Australia and New Zealand, with the Philippines and also with Japan These pacts were envisioned as the first step to achieve peace and security in Asia

But for a long time, the United States took no interest in the idea of an Asian defence pact In May 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had turned down a suggestion for forming such an alliance¹ In a speech on January 12, 1950 he emphasized the need to help the people of Asia to improve their social and economic conditions He also implied that, except for the Philippines, South East Asia was not regarded as an area vital to the security of the United States This announcement, it is believed, encouraged the communist government of North Korea to attack South Korea

Following the Korean war the attitude of the United States towards an Asian defence pact under-

¹ *Ibid*

meeting. ¹

Thailand and the Philippines were the only South-East Asian countries eager to throw their weight on the side of SEATO. Among the Colombo Powers, Pakistan was willing to attend the Conference but without making any advance commitment.

Notwithstanding these initial odds besetting the formation of SEATO, the United States was determined to go ahead and sign the pact, even if Thailand and the Philippines remained the only prospective signatories. There were broad indications at this stage that delay might thwart the Conference. For, if more South-East Asian nations fell in line with Chou En-Lai's plan to forge a pact of non-aggression and peaceful co-existence, it was feared that communist strategy would snatch a lead in South-East Asia and get the better of the non-communist diplomacy.

Consequently, on September 7, 1954 a conference was convened at Manila to give a definite shape to the idea of a treaty organization for securing peace and security in South-East Asia and the South West Pacific. Eight nations - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines - attended the Conference. //The United States delegation wanted

1. It should, however, be noted that following these developments the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Ali Sastroamidjojo, visited India to confer with Nehru over the possibility of creating an Asian Conference as alternative to SEATO. Later, he visited Premier U Nu of Burma. These diplomatic visits paved the way for a Colombo Powers' meeting in Java, at which plans were finalised for holding an Afro-Asian Conference.

the treaty to be exclusively a potential bulwark against communist aggression, whereas other delegates particularly the delegate of Pakistan, preferred a defence treaty against any brand of aggression. Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, who led the Pakistan delegation, insisted that the conference should not discriminate between various kinds of aggression. "Aggression is evil", he said "There were no varieties of evil in varieties of aggression and it was necessary to resist it wherever it came from".¹ Secretary of State Dulles had apparently agreed on the omission of the word 'communist' from the main body of the text of the Treaty, but he explained to the Conference that the United States would not undertake obligations for action in case of a quarrel between two non-communist states. The United States, therefore, appended a note to the text of the Treaty declaring that she was committed to act only against communist aggression rather than aggression in general. She however, promised to 'consult' in the event of an aggression other than communist.

The Treaty which was formally signed on September 8, 1954 by eight nations was declared to be in conformity with the United Nations' Charter. It provides that the member countries separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability. In furtherance of these objectives "the parties undertake to strengthen their free

¹ The Pakistan Times Lahore September 7 1954

institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social wellbeing and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments towards these ends."

// However, the Treaty goes much farther than this. According to its Article 4, each member, in the case of an armed attack against any signatory to the Treaty, would act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes." The Treaty also contains provisions designed to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without or within a state in the area.¹ But no action can be taken either against attack or subversion within the territory of any State except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned.

The area covered by the Treaty includes the entire territories of the 'Asian parties' and 'the general area of the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area, north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The 'Asian parties' cover Siam, Pakistan and the Philippines. It may be noted that Hong Kong and Formosa are not included in the Treaty area. The three Indochina states—Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam—have been covered in a separate protocol to the Treaty.

Attached to the Treaty is a second document—the Pacific Charter—which was drawn up at the suggestion of the late President Magasaysay of the Philippines in order to answer the charges of 'neo-colonialism'

1. For a deep analysis of the Treaty see Ralph Braibanti, *International Implications of the Manila Treaty*, paper prepared for the Thirteenth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lahore, Pakistan, February 3-14, 1958.

that have been levelled against the SEATO by Communists and neutralists. The Pacific Charter proclaims the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people.

The creation of SEATO, and Pakistan's participation in it particularly, invoked strong reactions from India, China and the Soviet Union. To the Prime Minister of India, the SEATO was an unfortunate development as it was bound to increase the sense of insecurity among the people.¹ To the Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai, SEATO, like NATO, was established "for the sole purpose of obtaining manpower and ensuring the setting up of new military springboards and bases, as well as to place the small countries in subordinate position, politically and economically."² There is no evidence that SEATO was directed against any country.³

The reaction of the Soviet Union to SEATO was no better. SEATO, as the Soviet Prime Minister saw it, was aimed at the "preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of national liberation movements and interference in the affairs of the Chinese People's Republic and other Asian countries."⁴

1 *The Statesman* New Delhi February, 26 1955

2 G. M. Kahin *The Asian African Conference* New York 1955 p. 63

3 peace and stability in Asia. That the Chinese Prime Minister accepted this explanation may be inferred from his

individual and collective efforts of the Government towards these ends."

At the second meeting of the SEATO Council Foreign Ministers which was held in Karachi, in March 1956, under the Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, it was agreed that there should be a stronger central organisation with headquarters in Bangkok. Therefore the Council authorised the establishment of a fulltime Secretariat and a permanent working group to assist the Council representatives in A Research Service centre was to be established in Bangkok under the Council Representatives to produce "reports on current developments on communist activities". It was also announced that an Economic Officer was to be appointed to facilitate the work in the economic field.

The communique issued at the end of the Karachi meeting of the SEATO Council in March, 1956 stressed the importance of economic progress and the defensive nature of the Treaty. The fact that the total volume of the United States allocations for economic aid to the Asian members of SEATO had increased almost fourfold since the signing of the Treaty was particularly welcomed. Further, it was claimed that the defence forces of the Asian members had been appreciably strengthened and that plans for the coordinated use of the forces in self defence, through military advisers, were taking firm shape. The communique also recorded appreciation of the British move to grant independence to Malaya within the Commonwealth.

The third meeting of the Council of SEATO was

held at Canberra in March 1957. The communique issued at the end of this meeting stated that the Council had decided to appoint a Secretary General and a Deputy Secretary General whose terms of reference were to be determined by the Council Representatives. To consolidate the progress made during the past years in preserving the independence of South-East Asian countries, the Council decided to provide for the "maintenance of the defensive capacity of the Treaty members to deal effectively with armed aggression; extension of the programme to detect, appraise, expose and combat subversion directed from without; and development of the economic resources of the Treaty members, particularly the Asian member states, by measures inside and outside SEATO". Apart from these the Council emphasized the need for cultural activities in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship which already exist between the members of SEATO.

From the point of view of Pakistan the existence of SEATO, which is a defensive consortium of like-minded states, has had the salutary effect of containing aggression in the Treaty area. Its membership has helped Pakistan through economic and military aid to consolidate the defences of East Pakistan and in turn to contribute her mite towards the restoration of poise and quiescence. Significant as it is, at the Karachi meeting of the SEATO Council it was confirmed that since the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line—the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan—all the borders of Pakistan fall under the protective mantle of SEATO. This was a very important development because it meant that Pakistan could invoke the treaty in case of attack on her north

western territories inhabited by the Pathans. Besides, the SEATO Council affirmed the need to settle the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiations. This assumed a particular significance after the Soviet leaders' inflammatory statements on Kashmir and 'Pakhtoonistan' during their tour of India and Afghanistan in December 1955. Damaging as those statements were to Pakistan's integrity, they could not elude the notice of her allies in the SEATO.

These, in brief, are the benefits which Pakistan has derived from its membership in SEATO. No doubt Pakistan's supreme interest lies in striving for peace and stability in South-East Asia for upon that depends, both directly and indirectly, the political and economic well-being of the people of Pakistan.

5

PAKISTAN AND THE BAGHDAD PACT

As a logical corollary to her membership in the SEATO, the decision of Pakistan to join the Baghdad Pact was motivated by her desire to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East. It is an area which is contiguous to West Pakistan and has been in the grip of the same ferment that seized South-East Asia. Pakistan has manifold interests in the Middle East. It is a natural area for the development of her trade, though until recently it has accounted for only 1 per cent of Pakistan's export and 10 per cent of her import. But lately the prospects of jute export have brightened, for Pakistan is helping Egypt, Iraq and the Lebanon to set up jute mills. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation is investing a sizable capital in them. Moreover, Pakistan is specially interested in the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, for over 70 per cent of her trade passes through it. Pakistan's intrinsic interest in the Middle East also stems from the fact that it was the cradle of Islamic culture and civilization. The majority of the people of Pakistan are Muslims and as such they have strong religious, ethnic and cultural ties with the people of the Middle East. Besides, the region has strategic importance. Its occupation by any hostile power could not only harm Pakistan economically, but

militarily also it can endanger her freedom and security

Because of its great strategic importance, the Middle East has always been coveted by the Great Powers. It is a land bridge that provides sea and air communications between three continents of the world, namely, Europe, Asia and Africa. It contains nearly two thirds of the world's oil reserves. It is not surprising, therefore, that since the beginning of World War II the Middle East should have figured highly in the Great Power strategy. Until recently, Great Britain exercised the dominating influence over this area. Nevertheless, she always feared that the conquest of this region by the Soviet Union, which is contiguous to it, would endanger the West's southern flank and also cut off her communication-lines with the Far East. Of course, Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, has been showing keen interest in this region which stretches along her under belly. During the inter war period when Hitler grew in power and set about achieving his place in the sun, the Soviet Union had resumed her historic role in the Middle East. After Molotov's negotiations with Hitler, prior to Germany's attack on Russia, it was formally set down in a Secret Protocol No. 1, attached to the draft of a Four Power Agreement for a 'new order', dated November 26, 1940 that "the Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." However, World War II proved a set-back to it.

1. Quoted in Halford L. Hoskins *The* : " New York, 1954 p 13

Russian aspirations in the Middle East. Russia did occupy Persia in cooperation with Britain during the course of war. The war over, Russia not only continued occupation of Persia but also created in its North a puppet communist Government, but she withdrew when Britain and the United States protested vigorously, and the United Nations put its pressure. After that, for some years she did not take any active interest in the Middle East. There were many reasons for it. The Soviet Union, which emerged from the war badly mauled, was afraid to tempt American intervention. Britain and France were so devastated by the war that they could hardly contain the Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, therefore, preferred to keep away the United States even at the cost of tolerating the British. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was busy consolidating her gains in Eastern Europe and could not possibly embark upon new adventures in Asia.

The United States, which could help maintain peace and stability in the Middle East took little interest in this region during the postwar period; for she looked upon it as Great Britain's sphere of influence. The United States felt concerned only about the development of her oil interests in Saudi Arabia and the acquisition of the important air base at Dhahran. In the establishment of Israel, however, the United States played a notable role, without perhaps realising its future consequences.

It was not until 1951 that the United States, alarmed by the Korean war and communist advances in Asia, began to prepare herself to cope with the problems relating to the security of the Middle East.

In August 1951 President Eisenhower, in his address to the Senate Armed Services Committee stated unequivocally: "This area is tremendously important in terms of what it could contribute for our whole effort. We should use our resources, our power, our organizational ability and, above all, our leadership to get some kind of organization that would rally all of them to go in with us."¹ This was not an easy task. For, at the end of the Second World War, the Middle East emerged as a political tinder box. The creation of the state of Israel in the heart of the Middle East was very much resented by the Arabs. They refused to recognise Israel's existence. Moreover, the expulsion of 800,000 Arabs from Israel, gave a large measure of fixity to the most bitter dispute between Arabs and Israel. These homeless Arabs are now scattered throughout the Middle East, living on meagre rations supplied by the United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency.

This disturbing factor in the stability of the Middle East was followed by the Anglo Iranian oil dispute and the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal Zone. The former dispute was not only an expression of hostility against the West but also an effusion of anti western nationalism directed against a foreign oil company. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which closely resembled the East-India Company, had made huge profits out of Persia. In 1951 Dr. Musaddiq nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; it stirred a serious crisis in the area. Without dilating on the under-currents of this crisis

¹ 1. *The New York Times*, August 8, 1951.

at length, it must be stated that it gave impetus to the Egyptian struggle to get rid of the British forces from the Suez Zone. In other words, Persia had shown how Britain might be defied. From then on anti-British activities in Egypt intensified.

Britain, however, refused to yield before the pressure of Egyptian nationalism. It was argued that the British troops did not constitute an occupation army, or prejudice Egypt's sovereign rights. The main purpose of the British forces was to safeguard the Suez Canal, the international waterway.

No Egyptian nationalist was willing to agree with the British on this count. They regarded the Treaty of 1936, which allowed Britain to station troops on the Egyptian soil, as derogatory to their national pride. As soon as the Second World War was over, Egypt had started pressing for the revision of the Treaty. Egypt also demanded the withdrawal of Britain from the Sudan, hoping that the latter would then merge with Egypt, resurrecting the historical *status quo* before the revolt of Mehdi. These problems deepened the discord between Britain and Egypt.

In 1951, the Anglo-Egyptian relations entered a crucial stage. The Egyptian demand that Britain should abrogate the 1936 Treaty and the 1889 Condominium Agreement gained high momentum. The tempo of nationalist sentiment made Britain and her allies anxious to find an alternative for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. It was feared that with the withdrawal of the British troops from the Suez Canal zone, a power vacuum might be created in the Middle East. In fact, the initial aim of Western Allies

was to close up the Middle East security gap by the same kind of barrier which they had set up under NATO to stop the Russian advance in Western Europe. In October 1951, therefore, four powers—the United States, Britain, France and Turkey—offered Egypt a proposal on the Middle East defence, which envisaged the setting up of an Allied Middle East Command. “Egypt belongs to the free world”, it was stated in the introduction to the draft, “and in consequence her defence and that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations”¹ Egypt was to associate with the proponents of the Pact as an equal partner. In the event of the Egyptian acceptance of the proposal, Britain was ready to withdraw her forces from the Suez Canal Zone. And Egypt, it was proposed, would assume control of the defences of the Suez Canal and the installations in the Suez Canal Zone on condition that the latter would be made available for use as an Allied base,² in the event of an attack on Turkey.

This Four Power proposal suffered a setback at the very outset. The Egyptian Government could not consider it, said the Egypt's Minister of Interior in the Parliament, “while there are British forces of occupation in Egypt and the Sudan”. The other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Syria, supported Egypt in her stand. The Syrian Prime Minister, speaking in his Parliament on October 23, 1951 stated: “Those inviting us to join them against possible Russian aggression have themselves planted Israel as a thorn in our

1 Halford L. Hoskins *The Middle East* New York 1954 p 281

2 *Ibid*

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publican Party came to power, abandoned the idea of a Middle East Defence Organization to be based on the model of NATO. As the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, after a tour of the Asian countries noted // "A Middle East Defence Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab countries are so engrossed with their quarrels, they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet Communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of this danger." To this he added "There is a vague desire to have a collective security system, but no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within, out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the inter-related defences of these countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West but to resist the common threat to all free peoples" //

✓ Such willingness was found among the two non-Arab states of Turkey and Pakistan. These states are not only contiguous to the Middle East but have also strong religious and cultural ties with that area. Besides, they are on the flanks of the 'northern tier' of the Middle East. Turkey, of course, was already tied in closely with the Western defence plans. There was no doubt about her ability to cooperate in any scheme for the Middle East Defence. But her failure to support the Arab cause in the Palestine war and her membership of NATO was a setback to her

1 Department of State Bulletin June 1, 1953, p 835

throats."¹ Moreover, Egypt, after rejecting the Four-Power proposal, abrogated the 1936 Treaty and the Condominium Agreement of 1899 under which Britain held sway in the Sudan. It set in to motion a train of events which resulted in armed clashes in Egypt and complete frustration, for the time being, of the Middle Eastern security plans.

In October 1951, the United States had announced that she would go ahead with the plan to establish a Middle East Defence Command despite Egypt's refusal to join it. Simultaneously, to give a solid base to the long range security objectives, the United States decided to give economic and technical aid to the countries of the Middle East under the Point Four Programme. Agreements were signed with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and the Lebanon. The projected economic and technical aid represented an attempt to develop solidarity and cooperation among the countries of the Middle East. But the plan for setting up a Middle East defence command was far from being implemented. After attempts to modify one plan after another failed, the United States discharged the plan for the command in favour of a defence organization. A Middle East Defence Organization was to be sponsored by the United States, Britain, France and Turkey together with Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. Although in terminology the transition had been made from an 'allied command' to 'defence organization', the approach was basically the same. It did not meet with any success either.

In 1953, the United States, shortly after the R

1. *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, 1951, p. 11774.

support collective security arrangements and to cooperate with the United States in controlling trade with nations that threaten world peace. The American-Pakistan Turkish arrangements, as a matter of fact, formed part of the 'northern tier' plan. The influential London *Economist* in its issue of January 9, 1954 rightly noted "A Pakistan American agreement is a part of a new scheme for the defence in the depth of the Middle East, where the earlier Anglo Franco American scheme for collective defence in association with Turkey, Egypt and other Arab states foundered partly on Arab xenophobia and partly on the Arab-Israel problem."

But Pakistan's alliances with Turkey and the United States, respectively, were opposed by Egypt, India and the Soviet Union. Even as early as January 1953, the Indian newspapers carried, on their front pages, a Press Trust of India despatch alleging that Pakistan was about to be included in the Middle East Defence Organization. Such reports had also appeared in other sections of the world press. The Prime Minister of India, while voicing India's concern about Pakistan joining MEDO, appeared to have felt that Pakistan's membership of MEDO meant that Pakistan would receive free military and economic aid which would put her in a strong bargaining position vis a vis India. Hitherto, India had opposed neither the formation of NATO, nor the military alliances of the communist bloc. That showed that India was not opposed in principle to military alliances as such but only to Pakistan's participations in these.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the reaction to MEDO in Pakistan was

potential influence on Arab states, in which xenophobic nationalism was order of the day. The position of Pakistan was somewhat different. She was a staunchly Muslim state, and her desire to strengthen the Muslim world was well known. Apart from this, Pakistan was keenly interested in the progress which Turkey had made after establishing close contacts with the West. At last, in April 1954, Turkey and Pakistan, both with the excellent armies, entered into a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation which provides for "joint study of requirements in production of arms and ammunition and exchange of information for the purpose of drawing benefits jointly from technical experience."

The Pact between Pakistan and Turkey was one of the most far-reaching development, in the Middle East since the end of the Second World War. Turkey, whose armed forces had already been strengthened through the United States' aid, was also a member of NATO. Pakistan by allying herself with Turkey became an indirect associate of NATO. Moreover, Pakistan is at once a part of the Middle East and the gateway to all of South-East Asia. East Pakistan is a vital link between South-East Asia and the Indian sub-continent. It stands in relation to Communist China much the same as does West Pakistan to Soviet Russia. In view of this, the Turco-Pakistan alliance was an invaluable contribution to the build up of a defensive bulwark against communism.

Shortly after the Turco-Pakistan Agreement came into being, the United States decided to give military aid to Pakistan to strengthen her defences and

Pakistan's participation in a U S plan to set up a military aggressive bloc in the Middle East ¹ The Government of Pakistan, in a reply to that note maintained that she was not intending to take any step hostile to the U S S R but that her primary concern was the security of the country ² In March 1953, Moscow sent a warning to Turkey as well that her treaty with Pakistan had "a direct relationship to Soviet security" and, therefore, she must take upon herself the responsibility for the consequences of such a situation ³ In rejecting the Russian protest Pakistan stressed the fact that the bases built in Pakistan are not for the use of the United States But it added there was "nothing to prevent Pakistan from inviting any friendly power, including the United States, to use such bases to help defend the region" ⁴ /

The idea of the Middle East defence, although it was opposed at the very outset by Egypt, India and the Soviet Union, did not fail to take shape Soon after the signing of the Turco Pakistan Agreement, it was announced in Baghdad that the United States had approved Iraq's request for military assistance The aid approved was unconditional, except that it was not to be used for aggressive

1 *Chronology of International Events & Documents*
November 13 1953 p 770

2 *Dawn* Karachi December 23 1953

3 *The New York Times* March 20 1954

Moreover at the Geneva Conference which was held in April 1954 Soviet Foreign Minister M Molotov attacked the United States for establishing new military bases close to Chinese territory on the Pacific islands and in Pakistan (*Ibid.*, May 5 1954)

4 *Ibid.*, May 28 1954

favourable. The *Dawn*, a leading newspaper of Pakistan, wrote: "Pakistan is both a Middle Eastern, as well as an Asian country; one half of Pakistan is contiguous to the Muslim Middle East and the other and more populous half is firmly planted in the very heart of South-East Asia. Furthermore, the unalterable historical fact of partition has conferred on this country the role of strategic guardianship of the entire sub-continent, both upon its west and upon its east. Consistently with the principles that Pakistan pursues and in the interest of not only herself but of the whole sub-continent which she guards on both flanks, Pakistan cannot but desire new source of strength." ¹ Also Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, while on a visit to Cairo in January 1953, had bluntly stated: "Pakistan is, of course, interested in the defence of the Middle East as we are a Middle Eastern country." ²

Egypt, the largest Arab state, was not only unfavourably disposed towards any idea of a MEDO but also regarded it as a manoeuvre to split the Arab world. Reacting to the plan for Western sponsored Middle Eastern defence, Egypt signed security pacts with Saudi Arabia and Syria, which shared Egypt's policy of non-alignment.

The Soviet Union, like India and Egypt, was also opposed to the strengthening of defences in the Middle East. In a note delivered to the Pakistan Government by the Soviet Ambassador in Karachi, in December 1953, it was stated that the Soviet Union could not regard with indifference the reports about

1. *Dawn*, Karachi, January 14, 1953.

2. *Ibid.*, February 22, 1953.

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purposes. The acceptance of military aid from the United States indicated Iraq's willingness to cooperate with the West.

Iraq, in fact, was the only Arab state which, partly because of the lurking fear of Russian intrigues with the Kurds, and partly because of her traditional rivalry with Egypt, was not averse to joining in an alliance with the West. In October 1954, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri es Said visited Turkey and openly said that his country's welfare was linked with Turkey and Iran and she might join the Turco-Pakistan Pact.¹ Iraq, however, had not been invited, so far, to join the Turco-Pakistan Pact. Therefore, in January 1955, when the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Iraq, it was announced that Iraq would conclude a treaty of defence and friendship with Turkey.

The terms of the Turco-Iraqi defence pact, which was formally signed on February 24, 1955, were rather vague. The parties agreed to cooperate for their security and defence. Its military details were to be worked out in separate agreements. A month later, this pact took a new turn with the entry of Britain into the fold. British adherence to it was not unexpected. On March 30, 1955, she concluded with Iraq a special agreement for mutual cooperation. It provides for close and continuous collaboration between the armed forces of the two countries. It also stipulated that the British shall be able to stock military stores and equipment in Iraq for use in war. Repair workshops and storage depots were also to be maintained for the benefit of Iraqi and British forces.²

1. *The Pakistan Times*, October, 19, 1954.

2. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, April, 1, 1955

Of the other countries invited to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact, which then came to be known as the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan and Iran responded. Pakistan, as already noted, had entered into separate agreements with the United States and Turkey. Besides, she was already a member of SEATO. The adherence of Iran to the Baghdad Pact was rather a sudden development. Iran had pursued a neutral policy for over a century and a half and being the next door neighbour of Russia, she was afraid of annoying her. Why did she set aside her traditional neutrality? It was because she came to realise that in the present world no weak state could afford to remain neutral without jeopardizing her national interests. She felt under the new strain of international politics that like other members of the United Nations, she was entitled to join any regional pact that guaranteed her security. Her adherence to the Baghdad Pact was welcomed by its proponents because it closed the gap in the 'northern tier' defence lines.

In the beginning the Baghdad Pact was beset with many initial handicaps. But its members have made slow but steady progress by pooling their resources. The first meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council, which was held in Baghdad in November, 1955, was attended by the Premiers of Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Iran and the British Foreign Secretary. The five powers reviewed the general international situation and discussed ways and means of promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Besides, they decided to establish permanent political, military and economic committees. The Pact's headquarters were set up in Baghdad. The United States, though she did not join

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Of the other countries invited to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact, which then came to be known as the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan and Iran responded. Pakistan, as already noted, had entered into separate agreements with the United States and Turkey. Besides, she was already a member of SEATO. The adherence of Iran to the Baghdad Pact was rather a sudden development. Iran had pursued a neutral policy for over a century and a half and being the next door neighbour of Russia, she was afraid of annoying her. Why did she set aside her traditional neutrality? It was because she came to realise that in the present world no weak state could afford to remain neutral without jeopardizing her national interests. She felt under the new strain of international politics that like other members of the United Nations, she was entitled to join any regional pact that guaranteed her security. Her adherence to the Baghdad Pact was welcomed by its proponents because it closed the gap in the 'northern tier' defence lines.

In the beginning the Baghdad Pact was beset with many initial handicaps. But its members have made slow but steady progress by pooling their resources. The first meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council, which was held in Baghdad in November, 1955, was attended by the Premiers of Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Iran and the British Foreign Secretary. The five powers reviewed the general international situation and discussed ways and means of promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Besides, they decided to establish permanent political, military and economic committees. The Pact's headquarters were set up in Baghdad. The United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have not joined the Pact.

the Baghdad Pact, formally, announced, at its first Council meeting, the establishment of military and political liaison with the Pact organization. The American Ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar Gelland, was designated head of the liaison group.

The second meeting of the Ministerial Council was held in Teheran in April 1956. The United States was represented at the meeting by a delegation of observers, headed by Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State. It emphasized the importance attached by the United States to the Pact. During the session, the United States became a full member of the Pact's Economic Committee and agreed to give further economic and technical aid to the members. The Council adopted a report of the Economic Committee which provided for the implementation of a resolution relating to projects "which are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote the wellbeing of the people in the Pact area." The delegates reached a unanimous agreement on a plan for combined efforts to combat subversion in the member-countries. The recommendations of the Secretary General for a permanent secretariat were also approved unanimously.

Deliberations at this meeting reared round regional disputes, such as Kashmir, Palestine and the Algerian issues which posed a threat to peace in the area. The attempts of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to subvert the Baghdad Pact also formed the subject of discussion. Pakistan was anxious to obtain approval of her demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. In its final communique, the Council emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes. The

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali in a subsequent Press statement welcomed the fact that the gravity of the Kashmir dispute was put on a par with the Palestine problem.

Furthermore, the Council agreed that the basic objective of international communism had remained unchanged, it attributed attacks on the pact by the neutralists and others to unnecessary misunderstandings on their part. Taking these facts into consideration, the United States joined the Counter Subversion Committee and agreed to establish a military liaison office at the permanent headquarters of the Pact. Details of the report of the Military Committee were not made public but it was stated in the communique that all members had agreed to expedite measures for the defence of the Treaty area.

As at this stage the Russian influence had begun to penetrate into the Middle East, the fear grew that the Soviet ground, air and naval forces which were stationed in areas adjacent to the Baghdad Pact countries, would march into the Middle East at any time. There were various factors which combined to strengthen this impression. The creation of the Baghdad Pact had highlighted some old dynastic feuds and rivalries in the Middle East. These rivalries stemmed directly from Cairo's constant efforts to gain ascendancy in the Arab world. President Nasser, when first invited to join the Baghdad Pact, appeared favourably disposed towards it, hoping perhaps to wrest from Iraq the Arab leadership in the alliance. Later, he seems to have changed his mind and leaned on the side of the Soviet Union and India in denouncing the Baghdad Pact as an instrument of western imperialism.

the affairs of the Arab countries. In January 1955 President Nasser called a conference of the Arab League to discuss the situation arising out of the proposed alliance between Turkey and Iraq. During the Conference, which was not attended by Iraq, it was announced that the Arab countries would not join the Turco-Iraqi Pact or any other military or political pact without the approval of the Arab League. Besides the conference paved the way for the Arab defence pacts between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia as a counter move to the Baghdad Pact.

But Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian cooperation could not be very effective, since none of these countries was strong enough either economically or militarily to resist aggression. Nor had they the natural resources to train and equip an army, air force, or navy which they badly needed in their continued conflict with Israel.

Egypt wanted to integrate the Arab states with Cairo as its control point. To attain this goal, she desired to achieve a Big Power status among the Arabs by pursuing a policy of active neutrality. At the same time Egypt wanted to become militarily strong because the State of Israel held out a constant threat to her security. The United States was willing to arm Egypt but on condition that Egypt either signed a mutual security pact, giving the United States the right to supervise the use of arms supplied by her, or paid the price of arms in dollars. Egypt refused to accept these terms. But soon afterwards she entered into an agreement with the Soviet bloc, bartering her cotton and rice for Soviet jets, tanks, submarines and other war equipment.

meeting in Teheran on November 5, 1956 to consider the situation. In a statement issued at the end of the meeting, they unanimously condemned Israeli aggression, called for immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt and requested the United Kingdom and France "to end hostilities immediately, to withdraw their forces from Egypt, and to respect fully the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Egypt." As for the Suez dispute, they said that it "must be settled under the auspices of the U.N. by negotiations with Egypt. Freedom of navigation through the Canal must be safeguarded, fully respecting Egyptian sovereignty."

So strong was the pressure brought to bear on Britain by the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact that it contributed in no insignificant measure to the cessation of hostilities in Egypt. That saved the Baghdad Pact itself from cracking up. Iraq had stated earlier that she would boycott any Baghdad Pact Council meeting attended by the United Kingdom. Under constant pressure from other members of the Arab League, Iraq had also announced that she stood together with the other Arab countries against the danger to their "freedom and dignity." It was the timely mediation of Pakistan which prevented Iraq from undermining the Pact by leaving it. Pakistan held the view, as its Foreign Minister stated subsequently, that there was no valid reason for insisting on the exclusion of United Kingdom from the next meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council since she was executing the will of U.N. with respect to Suez. Prime Minister of Iraq later agreed, as press-

The New York Times, December 8, 1956.

reports indicated, that his country might reconsider her refusal to take part in future meetings of the Baghdad Pact if the United States would enter the Pact ¹ But there was little prospect of the United States doing so In November 29, 1956, however, the United States announced that "she would view with the utmost gravity any threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Pakistan Iran, Iraq and Turkey " The pronouncement was welcomed by members of the Baghdad Pact

But it could not be expected that this pronouncement would have a stabilizing effect on the entire region which, as President Eisenhower put it, had "abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history " Egypt and Syria were becoming very receptive to red blandishments just to express their resentment against Britain and France On the whole, the time seemed ripe for the communists to sweep over the Middle East with its rich oil reserves Alarmed by this situation President Eisenhower proclaimed his new doctrine for the Middle East, which provided that the United States would use force "to protect the territorial integrity and political independence" of any Middle East State requesting such aid against communist aggression The idea underlying this declaration was to underwrite the freedom of the Middle Eastern countries, the Baghdad Pact by itself did not go far enough, at the moment, to meet the threat of international communism and the danger of subversion Time was running short Therefore, the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East was favourably received by the A. I. M.

1 *The Pakistan Times* Lahore January 22 1957

members of the Baghdad Pact. In a joint communique issued at the end of their conference in Ankara in January 1957 they declared their full support to the doctrine, noting that its provisions "were best designed to maintain peace in this area and advance the economic wellbeing of the people."¹ They also noted with satisfaction that the doctrine was not designed to create a sphere of influence or to enslave the people of the Middle East.

The decision of the Muslim members of the Pact to support the Eisenhower doctrine was also motivated by the fact that it promised to promote the broad objectives of the Baghdad Pact by augmenting the volume of economic and military aid. At the third meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council, which was held in Karachi in June 1957, the United States allocated from the Eisenhower Doctrine funds totaling 400 million dollars spread over 2 years, a sum of 12.5 million dollars for the development of tele-communications and implementation of other projects sponsored by the Economic Committee of the Pact.

The Karachi session of the Pact Council demonstrated the value and vitality of the Pact as a purely defensive association of like-minded nations. In their inaugural speeches all the delegates welcomed the United State's decision to join the Military Committee. It was no doubt a great step forward designed to revitalise the alliance. The final communique issued after the meeting said that the Council had noted with satisfaction the strengthening and the

1. *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, January 22, 1957.

continuing progress of the Pact // After a frank review of the international situation the Council recognised that the threat of subversion in the Pact area was growing serious. The Counter Subversive Committee, therefore, was directed to pursue, with full vigour, measures against subversion. The Council, after noting the Military Committee's unanimous report on the nature of threats in the Pact area accepted the proposal to set up a more comprehensive military structure. The Council also endorsed recommendations of the Economic Committee concerning the telecommunications and road and rail projects to link up the Baghdad Pact countries. These plans, when executed, will have great strategic importance, nor are their economic prospects by any means negligible.

The usefulness of the Pact for Pakistan and other members is in a way evident from the fact that it has been singled out by the communists and neutralists as their special target. To Pakistan, it has given an unmistakable assurance that she has won allies on whom she can count now in the event of aggression from outside. Addressing the Pakistan National Assembly on February 23, 1957, Prime Minister Suhrawardy had rightly stated "We were spending far too great a percentage than our national economy demands on our Armed Forces purely for defensive reasons. We found it, therefore, necessary to look out for friends and it was fortunate that countries that professed the same attitude and believed in the same form of democratic government came to our assistance. We found it necessary to request our friend the United States for military assistance, and an agreement was drawn up. Under the agreement, we have received a certain amount of military aid

“The aid we have thus received has enabled us to be strong enough to meet aggression from any quarter. But this aid would not have come in the measure in which it has come unless we did not contribute to the peace and security of the Middle East.

“It has therefore been necessary for us to join the Baghdad Pact. This is a Pact of purely defensive nature. It does not permit that any country which may have committed aggression would be helped by any of the members of the Pact.”¹

1. *Dawn*, Karachi, February 23, 1957.

6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Like any other young and dynamic state Pakistan has certain national interests which it cannot realise in isolation from other nations. It was the desire to realise these interests that influenced Pakistan's decision to join the regional pacts. First, Pakistan being a new and under-developed country wanted to develop her potentialities and for that she needed peace as well as economic and technical assistance. Secondly, Pakistan, which is without defensible frontiers and is surrounded by powerful neighbours, wanted to maintain her freedom and territorial integrity. Thirdly, Pakistan, the majority of whose people are the followers of Islam, desired to have fraternal ties with the Muslim countries of the world.

With these as the mainsprings of her foreign policy, it was not possible for Pakistan to sit on the fence or stay neutral. In fact, no small state in this troubled world can afford to remain neutral. The world has grown so small that mountains and oceans are no longer barriers between states. What happens in one country has its repercussions all over the world.

Besides, Pakistan is well aware of the fact that small nations are an element of weakness in the structure of peace; being unable to defend themselves, they invite aggression on the part of powerful neighbours. Pakistan, therefore, rejected the policy of neutrality as unrealistic and impracticable. She knew that she could never be strong enough to defend herself alone. She had to ask for military assistance from others.

But it has often been asked that if India could remain neutral why could not Pakistan do the same? Prime Minister Suhrawardy, during the debate on Foreign Policy in the National Assembly, gave an answer to this question : "India was a great country, he said, "She could place orders for 65 Canberra jets - the most modern type medium bombers—and pay for them. Pakistan could not even buy one from her own resources. India could buy 300 Centurian tanks—the most powerful tank—and could pay for them, while all the wealth of Pakistan could not get them." ¹ India, of course, has five times the population of Pakistan and far greater resources. She has an industrialised economy, while Pakistan is on the way to industrialisation, and for that purpose needs a sufficient speck of peace and security.///

Moreover, Pakistan is so situated that her defence is important not only for her own sake but also for the sake of India. East and West Pakistan are situated on the flanks of India. West Pakistan, as already noted in Chapter II, is contiguous to the Middle East, which has always been an area of vital strategic importance. And East Pakistan flanks on Burma not

— . *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, February 23, 1957,

far from where the advance of Japan was halted in the last World War. No invader, therefore, can enter India by land, without trespassing either East or West Pakistan.

Pakistan has, therefore, due to her peculiar geographic situation, vital interests and responsibilities both in the Middle East and South East Asia. But in its early years, Pakistan was unable to make any tangible contribution towards strengthening the edifice of peace in these regions, as she was born militarily weak. In addition, the various disputes between India and Pakistan, particularly the dispute about Kashmir and the distribution of Indus Basin waters, on which the very existence of the people of Pakistan depends, have confirmed the fear in Pakistani minds that India wants to reunite the two countries into one and annul the partition.

The fear of conflict with India and the vulnerable nature of the country's defences necessitated the allocation of nearly 61 per cent of Pakistan's entire revenues for defence purposes. The country could not possibly continue to spend a major portion of her revenue on defence without neglecting her economic developments. Therefore, in May 1954, Pakistan entered into a military pact with the United States which provided for military assistance "to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area or in the United Nations' collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation."

The United States aid to Pakistan is purely for

defensive purposes. The Government of Pakistan has declared time and again that the United States' military aid would not be used in a war of aggression. "We shall use this aid", said Prime Minister Suhrawardy, "if we are attacked."¹

Pakistan has no policy or design of aggression of any kind whatsoever against any country. But it cannot be denied that she wants to be sufficiently powerful to resist any attempt from any source to undermine her freedom and independence which she treasures so passionately. After the end of World War II there was ferment and instability in the Middle East and South-East Asia. There was fear that it might spread to Pakistan. It was also felt that Pakistan might find it impossible to stand alone if the greater part of these regions were to fall under communist domination. To prevent this danger and to save herself from the damage that might stem from the continuation of this situation, Pakistan decided to join the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. These are regional defence arrangements which fall under the scope of the United Nations Charter. They threaten no one and "merely represent an attempt to strengthen the defensive capacity of member states in areas of the world where it is clearly needed."

Article I of the Baghdad Pact specifically lays down that "consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter", which provides that nothing in the Charter shall impair the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence", the high contracting parties will cooperate for their security and defence. Like

1. *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, February 23, 1957.

the Baghdad Pact, SEATO also does not affect in any way the right and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security. Again, Article 2 of SEATO clearly lays down "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability."

In fact, Pakistan has made a positive contribution to the peace and security of the Middle East and South East Asia by joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO respectively. The economic and military aid, which Pakistan has received under these pacts, enables her to gain strength to meet aggression from any quarter. This aid, as Prime Minister Suhrawardy told the National Assembly on February 23, 1957, would not have come if Pakistan had not joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan has now allies, willing to stand by her in case of crisis. It is an important development in the history of Pakistan's foreign relations. In February 1957, when discussion on Kashmir was resumed in the Security Council, Pakistan's allies, some of whom are members of the Security Council, unequivocally supported Pakistan's legitimate stand in Kashmir. It hardly need be reiterated that in March 1946 the SEATO Council of Foreign Ministers confirmed, in a communique, that the sovereignty of Pakistan extended up to the Durand Line. Since August 1947 Pakistan has

sought for some safeguards against attack from outside. The United Nations Charter does not constitute such a safeguard; for, obviously, the provisions of the Charter can be provoked only in case of an armed aggression. Nor has the Commonwealth guaranteed the integrity of Pakistan's frontiers. But the United States' Government, in re-affirming her policy towards the Baghdad Pact nations, declared on November 30, 1956 that she would view with "utmost gravity" any threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Pakistan, and other countries linked with the Pact. Referring to a news-item in a Pakistani newspaper under the headline "U.S. not to help Pakistan if attacked by non-Red Power" ¹, the United States Ambassador, Horace A. Hildreth, in a letter to Prime Minister Suhrawardy reaffirmed the above policy which guaranteed Pakistan's freedom and territorial integrity. Could Pakistan become more secure, without joining the Baghdad Pact or SEATO? Any student of international affairs, after taking stock of the situation, would know the answer to this question.

There can be no manner of doubt that the membership of the Baghdad Pact has helped Pakistan to strengthen the cause of peace and security in the Middle East. In December 1956, when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt, the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact promptly condemned the action and asked the United Kingdom to withdraw her forces from the Egyptian soil. The Baghdad Pact, however, was not invoked simply because it was of a defensive nature. But it must be noted that Britain listened to the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact and their

1. *Morning News*, Karachi, February 1, 1957.

voice considerably influenced the withdrawal of her forces from Egypt.

Moreover, Pakistan, by joining the Baghdad Pact did not wish to come into conflict with the policies of the other Middle Eastern countries. This Pact was in strict conformity with the policy of safeguarding the interests of the people of the Middle East. If some of the Middle Eastern countries turned against Pakistan's foreign policy, they were certainly those who had not cared to support Pakistan on the Kashmir question. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Lebanon have realised the necessity of Pakistan's entry into the Baghdad Pact, even though they had not joined it. Saudi Arabia, with whom Pakistan maintains friendly relations, has gone to the extent of stating that she would help Pakistan in getting justice in Kashmir.

It would not be irrelevant to point out here that in February 1957 Habib Bourguibba, former Premier of Tunisia, wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of India asking him to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir¹. Almost all the Muslim countries, with the exception of Egypt, have lent support to Pakistan's foreign policy. But Egypt alone, as Prime Minister Suhrawardy put it, "did not constitute the Muslim world". Pakistan has Iran, Iraq and Turkey as her allies and closest friends. They are willing to stand by Pakistan in her hour of crisis. Pakistan is also willing to stand by them in their hour of trial. And these four allies account for more than two thirds of the entire population of the Middle East.

¹ Dawn Karachi February 9 1957

Pakistan and her associates in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, have the support of Britain and the United States, which are among the most powerful nations in the world today. Without their support either Pact would dwindle into a 'paper tiger' in the Chinese phraseology. The Asian members do not have the resources for building up military strength, even though they have the finest armies in the world. Through economic and military aid, Britain and the United States are helping them not only to consolidate their defences but also to build up their economic strength.

Very often the question has been asked. What do these Great Powers, particularly the United States, expect of Pakistan in return for economic and military aid? The answer to this question was given by the former United States Ambassador in Pakistan, Horace A. Hildreth, in one of his press conferences at Dacca, when he observed that his country expects "the same thing that Pakistan expects of itself - to become capable of defending herself against subversion, to play an important role in the collective security pacts, which Pakistan believes are beneficial to her to develop into a strong independent nation with a high standard of living, and not to compromise its principles in its struggle for freedom and security." It is not right to say that a country which receives free economic and military aid becomes subservient to her benefactor. Nor is it true that economic and military aid from the West "reverses the process of Asian liberation", as Nehru seems to think. On the contrary, it saves weak nations from falling under

1. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 31, 1955.

communist domination, for communism, as is well known, flourishes in a state where the people suffer from poverty and hunger. India herself is anxious to keep the wolf from her door and is receiving economic aid from the United States.

At the end of World War II, the European countries too received economic and military aid from the United States under various programmes. That enabled them to stand on their feet, economically and militarily. Even now Britain is receiving aid from the United States and has given her air bases. Likewise, a large number of Asian, European and American states, big and small, have military pacts with the United States. All of them pursue independent foreign policies and they are in no way tied to the apron strings of the United States.

Obviously, many people in Pakistan seem to think that Pakistan's relations with China and the Soviet Union have suffered a set back, after she joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. In real fact, these pacts must not bedevil Pakistan's relations with either China or the Soviet Union. Pakistan has repeatedly assured them that the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact are regional pacts and they are not directed against any country. The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, it may be reiterated, had assured Chou En Lai at the Bandung Conference that from Pakistan's viewpoint, SEATO was a purely defensive pact and that Pakistan was not against China. The Chinese Prime Minister did not fail to accept this explanation. In October 1956, while Prime Minister Suhrawardy was visiting China, Chou

that Pakistan's membership of SEATO should not be a bar to friendly relations between Pakistan and China.¹

If Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union are not so friendly, Pakistan is not to blame for that. During their tour of India and Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders made statements on Kashmir and 'Pakhtoonistan' which were damaging to Pakistan's vital interests. In spite of that Pakistan tried to be on good terms with the Soviet Union which tried belatedly to blunt the sharp edge of hostile pronouncements. Pakistan is a small country; and does not wish to provoke the Soviet Union. She has assured Moscow time and again that the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact are not aimed against any communist state. Pakistan's adherence to them should not, therefore, vex the communist bloc.

Lastly, but quite importantly, it must be reiterated that Pakistan believes that aggression, from whichever quarter it comes and in whatever form, is an evil thing, and must be resisted, singly or collectively. That was why Pakistan joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact which provide the best guarantee for safeguarding and promoting her national interests.

1. *Dawn*, Karachi, October 24, 1956.

APPENDICES

*Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
between
The Government of Pakistan
and
The Government of the United States
of America*

The Government of Pakistan and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purpose and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self defence in support of those purposes and principles ,

Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to participate in United Nations collective defence arrangements and measures, and to obtain agreement on universal regulation and re

armament under adequate guarantee against violation or evasion ;

Taking into consideration the support which the Government of the United States has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended ;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance ;

Have agreed :

ARTICLE I

1. The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory or supplementary thereto, appropriation acts thereunder, or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use this

assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self defence, or to permit it to participate in defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3 Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required or used exclusively for the purposes for which originally made available will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.

4 The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or service received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.

5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

6 Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this agreement.

7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Pakistan will so

segregate or assure title to all funds allocated to derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organisation or government.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments, will, upon request of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interest and maintain necessary security safeguards.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government of the United States rupees for the use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such funds.

2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United

States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance

3 Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by or on behalf of the Government of the United States for the common defense and including expenditures for airfield and post offices of the United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish procedures similar to both Governments so that such expenditure will be not of taxes.

ARTICLE IV

1 The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authorities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned will, in their relations with the Government of Pakistan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded other personnel of corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their respective immediate deputies.

2 The Government of Pakistan will grant

exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or of their families and will take reasonable administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families.

ARTICLE V

1. *The Government of Pakistan will :*

- (a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;
- (b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
- (c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
- (d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and
- (e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

2. (a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such

other governments as the Parties hereto may in each case agree upon such equipment, materials services or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security

(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources and which may be available in Pakistan Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export

ARTICLE VI

In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace

ARTICLE VII

1 The Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article I paragraphs 2 and 4, and arrangements entered into under Article

I, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, and under Article II, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th. day of May, one thousand nine hundred and fifty four.

*The Agreement For Friendly Cooperation
between
Pakistan and Turkey*

Preamble Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the U N Charter, and their determination always to endeavour to apply and give effect to these purposes and principles, desirous of promoting the benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from the sincere friendship existing between them, recognizing the need for consultation and cooperation *between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the well being and security of their peoples,* and being convinced that such cooperation would be in the interest of all peace loving nations, and in particular of nations in the region of the contracting parties, the two countries have therefore decided to conclude this Agreement for friendly cooperation

Art 1 —The contracting parties undertake to refrain from intervening in any way in the internal affairs of each other, and from participating in any alliance or activities directed against the other

Art 2 — They will consult on international matters of mutual interest, and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate to the maximum extent.

Art. 3 —They will develop the

*The South East Asia
Collective Defence Treaty*

Preamble. The parties to this treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will

precipitate that the parties stand together in the area,
d

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for
collective defence for the preservation of peace and
security,

Therefore, agree as follows

ARTICLE 1

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations, to settle any international
disputes, in which they may be involved, by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and
security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use
of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations

ARTICLE 2

In order more effectively to achieve the objective
of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by
means of continuous and effective self help and mutual
aid, will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack and to
prevent and counter subversive activities directed
from without against their territorial integrity and
political stability

ARTICLE 3

The parties undertake to strengthen their
institutions and to cooperate with one another in
further development of economic measures, includ
technical assistance, designed both to promote eco
mic progress and social well-being and to further

individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE 4

1. Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which would be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any state designated by unanimous agreement under Paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE 5

The parties hereby establish a council, on which

each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE 6

This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and under takes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

ARTICLE 7

Any other state in a position to further the objectives of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the parties, be invited to accede to this treaty. A state so invited may become a party to the treaty depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 8

As used in this treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any state acceding to this treaty in accordance with Article 7 or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE 9

1. This treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other signatories.

2. The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other state on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 10

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but

promote the self government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire in and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to insure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional processes,

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well being in this region ,

Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity

Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954

*Pact of Mutual Cooperation
between
Iraq and Turkey*

WHEREAS the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of friendship and good neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on the 29th of March, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article II of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of the Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect any of the rights and obligations accruing to the contracting parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with)

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries

His Majesty King Faisal II
King of Iraq

His Excellency Nuri Al Said
Prime Minister

His Excellency Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Celal Bayar
President of the Turkish Republic

His Excellency Adnan Menderes
Prime Minister

His Excellency Professor Fuat Koprulu
Minister for Foreign Affairs

who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows

ARTICLE I

Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ARTICLE II

In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the cooperation provided for in Article

I above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present Pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present Pact.

ARTICLE V

The Pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the state concerned is deposited with the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Iraq

Any acceding State party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more states parties to the present Pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Government of the Parties concerned.

ARTICLE VI

A Permanent Council of ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four Powers become parties to the Pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

ARTICLE VII

This Pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact by notifying the other Parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above mentioned periods, in which case the Pact remains valid for other Parties.

ARTICLE VIII

This pact shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

IN WITNESS whereof, the said Plenipot
have signed the present Pact in Arabic, Tu.
English all three texts being equally authentic
in the case of doubt when the English +
prevail.

DONE in duplicate at Baghdad this second
Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty
day of February 1955.

(Signed) Nuri Al-Said

For His Majesty The King of Iraq

(Signed) Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan

For His Majesty The King of Iraq

(Signed) Adnan Menderes

For the President of the Turkish Republic

(Signed) Fuat Koprulu

For the President of the Turkish Republic

